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Estimating the Causal Effect of Forced Eradication on Coca Cultivation in Colombian Municipalities

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  • Reyes, Luis Carlos

Abstract

Colombia has aggressively pursued forced coca eradication to reduce the amount of land that agricultural households devote to illegal crops. However, few rigorous empirical studies have assessed its causal effect on land allocation decisions. I use a 6-year panel covering the entire country for the years 2001–06 to estimate this effect. I instrument eradication with changes in the expected cost of protecting eradication crews as they get far from the airports used as a point of departure. Estimates show the causal effect of a 1% increase in eradication to be approximately a 1% increase in coca cultivation.

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  • Reyes, Luis Carlos, 2014. "Estimating the Causal Effect of Forced Eradication on Coca Cultivation in Colombian Municipalities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 70-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:61:y:2014:i:c:p:70-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.03.024
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    Cited by:

    1. Mounu Prem & Juan F. Vargas & Daniel Mejía, 2023. "The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 344-358, March.
    2. Daniel Mejía & Pascual Restrepo & Sandra V. Rozo, 2017. "On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 570-594.
    3. Austin L. Wright, 2016. "Economic Shocks and Rebel," HiCN Working Papers 232, Households in Conflict Network.
    4. Vasquez Escallon, Juanita, 2015. "When too much punishment decreases legality. The case of coca-reducing policies in Colombia," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113156, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Greenfield, Victoria A. & Bond, Craig A. & Crane, Keith, 2017. "A household model of opium-poppy cultivation in Afghanistan," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 741-761.
    6. Juan Pablo Cote, 2019. "The Effect of Interdiction on Coca Cultivation in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 17316, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    7. Carvajal, Hernán, 2023. "Efectos de la suspensión de las aspersiones aéreas con glifosato sobre la deserción escolar en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20307, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    8. Ladino, Juan Felipe & Saavedra, Santiago & Wiesner, Daniel, 2021. "One step ahead of the law: The net effect of anticipation and implementation of Colombia’s illegal crops substitution program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    9. José Fernández & Matteo Pazzona, 2015. "Evaluating the Spillover Effects of the Plan Colombia in Ecuador," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 15/667, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    10. Millán-Quijano, Jaime & Pulgarín, Sebastián, 2023. "Oiling up the field. Forced internal displacement and the expansion of palm oil in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    11. Eleonora Dávalos & Leonardo Fabio Morales, 2019. "Is there a balloon effect? Coca crops and forced eradication in Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo CIEF 17350, Universidad EAFIT.
    12. Pinedo, Wilman J. Iglesias, 2022. "The Effect of Plan Colombia on the Value of Legal Agricultural Production," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322605, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    13. Alejandra Vélez, María & Lobo, Iván, 2019. "Challenges of organised community resistance in the context of illicit economies and drug war policies: insights from Colombia," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100325, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Diego A. Martin, 2023. "The Impact of a Rise in Expected Income on Child Labor: Evidence From Coca Production in Colombia," CID Working Papers 150a, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    15. Grisaffi, Thomas & Farthing, Linda & Ledebur, Kathryn & Paredes, Maritza & Pastor, Alvaro, 2021. "From criminals to citizens: The applicability of Bolivia’s community-based coca control policy to Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    16. Camacho, Adriana & Mejía, Daniel, 2017. "The health consequences of aerial spraying illicit crops: The case of Colombia," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 147-160.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agricultural households; cocaine; Colombia; illegal crops;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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