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Teamwork, monitoring and absence

  • Heywood, John S.
  • Jirjahn, Uwe
  • Wei, Xiangdong

We present a model showing that firms with interdependent worker productivity (team production) have a higher cost of absence and as a consequence will spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates, all else equal. Using the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (UK), we are the first to estimate each of these related associations showing that absence has a greater cost in the face of team production, that firms with team production engage in greater monitoring and that firms with team production have reduced absence.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 68 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 676-690

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:3-4:p:676-690
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