IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/lrk/eeaart/30_1_11.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Glass Ceiling or Slippery Floors? Understanding Gender Differences in the Spanish Worker’s Compensation System/¿Techo de cristal o suelo resbaladizo? Comprendiendo las diferencias de género en el sistema de indemnización por accidente

Author

Listed:
  • MORAL DE BLAS, ALFONSO

    () (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Jurídicas y de la Comunicación de Segovia. Universidad de Valladolid.)

  • CORRALES-HERRERO, HELENA

    () (Departamento Economía Aplicada, UNIVERSIDAD DE VALLADOLID, ESPAÑA.)

  • MARTÍN-ROMÁN, ÁNGEL

    () (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Jurídicas y de la Comunicación de Segovia. Universidad de Valladolid.)

Abstract

The main goal of this paper is to analyse gender differences in the Spanish workplace accident insurance or worker’s compensation (WC) system. More specifically, we are interested in understanding the differences between female and male employees in the duration of the recovery spell after a workplace accident. This will provide us with a better comprehension of the distinct opportunistic behaviour carried by men and women causing absenteeism. Our results show that women who are occupied in low-responsibility jobs experience unjustified longer periods of recovery than men. But, as the occupational ladder is climbed this pattern tends to disappear and, what is more striking, on top of the ladder women are found to be more job-committed than men. Besides, business cycle seems to have a greater effect on women than men. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es analizar las diferencias de género asociadas al seguro por accidente de trabajo o al sistema español de indemnización a los trabajadores. Más específicamente, estamos interesados en entender las diferencias en el tiempo de recuperación después de un accidente de trabajo entre hombres y mujeres. Con ello conseguimos un conocimiento mejor de la conducta oportunista que genera el absentismo laboral. Los resultados muestran que las mujeres que ocupan puestos de trabajo de menor responsabilidad experimentan periodos injus-tificados de recuperación más prolongados que los hombres. Pero, según ascendemos en la escala ocupacional este comportamiento tiende a desaparecer y, lo que es más significativo, en la parte superior de la escala ocupacional las mujeres se encuentran más comprometidas con el trabajo que los hombres. Además, el ciclo económico parece tener un mayor efecto sobre el tiempo de recuperación de las mujeres que de los hombres.

Suggested Citation

  • Moral De Blas, Alfonso & Corrales-Herrero, Helena & Martín-Román, Ángel, 2012. "Glass Ceiling or Slippery Floors? Understanding Gender Differences in the Spanish Worker’s Compensation System/¿Techo de cristal o suelo resbaladizo? Comprendiendo las diferencias de género en el sist," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 30, pages 311-340, Abril.
  • Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:30_1_11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.revista-eea.net
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
    2. Alan B. Krueger, 1990. "Workers' Compensation Insurance and the Duration of Workplace Injuries," NBER Working Papers 3253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Richard J. Butler & Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, 2001. "The Effects Of Worker Heterogeneity On Duration Dependence: Low-Back Claims In Workers Compensation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 708-716, November.
    4. Even, William E. & Macpherson, David A., 1990. "Plant size and the decline of unionism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 393-398, April.
    5. Guadalupe, Maria, 2003. "The hidden costs of fixed term contracts: the impact on work accidents," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 339-357, June.
    6. Barmby, T A & Orme, C D & Treble, John G, 1991. "Worker Absenteeism: An Analysis Using Microdata," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(405), pages 214-229, March.
    7. Konstantinos, Pouliakas & Ioannis, Theodossiou, 2010. "An Inquiry Into the Theory, Causes and Consequences of Monitoring Indicators of Health and Safety At Work," MPRA Paper 20336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Fairlie, Robert W, 1999. "The Absence of the African-American Owned Business: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Self-Employment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 80-108, January.
    9. Francine Blau & Jed DeVaro, 2006. "New Evidence on Gender Differences in Promotion Rates: An Empirical Analysis of a Sample of New Hires," Working Papers 891, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    10. Tim A. Barmby & Marco G. Ercolani & John G. Treble, 2002. "Sickness Absence: An International Comparison," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 315-331, June.
    11. Oaxaca, Ronald, 1973. "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(3), pages 693-709, October.
    12. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 2005. "Moral hazard and sickness insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1879-1890, September.
    13. Carlos García-Serrano & Virginia Hernanz & Luis Toharia, 2010. "Mind the Gap, Please! The Effect of Temporary Help Agencies on the Consequences of Work Accidents," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 162-182, June.
    14. Virginia Hernanz & Luis Toharia, 2006. "Do Temporary Contracts Increase Work Accidents? A Microeconometric Comparison between Italy and Spain," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(3), pages 475-504, September.
    15. Bridges, Sarah & Mumford, Karen, 2001. "Absenteeism in the UK: A Comparison across Genders," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 69(3), pages 276-284, June.
    16. repec:fth:prinin:261 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Paringer, Lynn, 1983. "Women and Absenteeism: Health or Economics?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 123-127, May.
    18. Andrea Ichino & Regina T. Riphahn, 2005. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Absenteeism During and After Probation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 120-143, March.
    19. Paul Miller, 2009. "The Gender Pay Gap in the US: Does Sector Make a Difference?," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 52-74, March.
    20. Kenyon, Peter & Dawkins, Peter, 1989. "A Time Series Analysis of Labour Absence in Australia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(2), pages 232-239, May.
    21. Magnus Henrekson & Mats Persson, 2004. "The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 87-114, January.
    22. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. " The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
    23. Helena Corrales Herrero & Ángel L. Martín Román & Alfonso Moral de Blas, 2008. "La duración de las bajas por accidente laboral en España: ¿Se justifican las diferencias por comunidades autónomas?," Revista de Economía Laboral - Spanish Journal of Labour Economics, Asociación Española de Economía Laboral - AEET, vol. 5, pages 73-98.
    24. Groot, Wim & van den Brink, Henriette Maassen, 1996. "Glass ceilings or dead ends: Job promotion of men and women compared," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 221-226, November.
    25. Leigh, J. Paul, 1985. "The effects of unemployment and the business cycle on absenteeism," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 159-170, May.
    26. Allen, Steven G, 1981. "An Empirical Model of Work Attendance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(1), pages 77-87, February.
    27. Nielsen, Helena Skyt, 1998. "Discrimination and detailed decomposition in a logit model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 115-120, October.
    28. Denis Bolduc & Bernard Fortin & France Labrecque & DPaul Lanoie, 2002. "Workers' Compensation, Moral Hazard and the Composition of Workplace Injuries," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(3), pages 623-652.
    29. Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2003. "A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, and gender," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 295-322, April.
    30. Mohammed Chaudhury & Ignace Ng, 1992. "Absenteeism Predictors: Least Squares, Rank Regression, and Model Selection Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(3), pages 615-635, August.
    31. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 448-474, June.
    32. John Walker, 2009. "Earnings, Effort, and Work Flexibility of Self-Employed Women and Men: The Case of St. Croix County, Wisconsin," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 269-288, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Riesgo moral; comportamiento oportunista; sistema de indemnización y techo de cristal. ; Moral Hazard; Opportunistic Behaviour; Worker’s Compensation; Glass Ceiling..;

    JEL classification:

    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:30_1_11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Beatriz Rodríguez Prado). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fcvldes.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.