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Reporting Sick: Are Sporting Events Contagious?

Moral hazard is easy to justify theoretically but difficult to detect empirically. Individuals may report sick due to illness as well as for moral hazard reasons. Potential abuse of the sickness insurance system in Sweden is estimated by comparing the change between the number of men and women who report sick during a popular sporting event and a preceding time period. Difference-in- difference estimates provide clear evidence that the number of men who reported sick increased in order to watch the sporting event on television.

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File URL: http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp02_04.pdf
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Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2002:4.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 28 Feb 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2002_0004
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
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