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Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions Between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance in Sweden

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  • Larsson, Laura

    () (Department of Economics)

Abstract

This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. There are two main topics of interest: how the sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent sick period among the unemployed are affected by (i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the difference in maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit expiration date approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick-report rate because SI offers greater compensation than UI. But neither of these factors seems to have a significant effect on the length of the sick period.

Suggested Citation

  • Larsson, Laura, 2002. "Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions Between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance in Sweden," Working Paper Series 2002:5, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2002_005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Larsson, 2006. "Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 97-113, March.
    2. Hesselius, Patrik, 2003. "Does Sick Absence Increase the Risk of Unemployment?," Working Paper Series 2003:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    3. Hallberg, Daniel, 2003. "A Description of Routes out of the Labor Force for Workers in Sweden," Working Paper Series 2003:23, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment insurance; sickness insurance; health; duration analysis; discrete hazard models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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