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Pay, Technology, And The Cost Of Worker Absence

Author

Listed:
  • Melvyn Coles
  • Joseph Lanfranchi

    (CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

  • Ali Skalli

    (LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas)

  • John Treble

Abstract

Conventional studies of absenteeism concentrate on labor supply. An equilibrium approach, however, establishes that the shadow cost of absenteeism varies across firms that operate different technologies. Using an unusual employee/employer matched data set from France, which records both individual worker absenteeism and information about technology, we show that firms operating just‐in‐time technology have higher shadow costs of absence than firms that do not. The estimates are used to calculate the economy‐wide cost of absence, which turns out to be very low. (JEL J22, J31, J41)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Melvyn Coles & Joseph Lanfranchi & Ali Skalli & John Treble, 2007. "Pay, Technology, And The Cost Of Worker Absence," Post-Print hal-01895541, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01895541
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00031.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Marsden, David, 2010. "The end of national models in employment relations?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 48913, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Joseph Lanfranchi & John Treble, 2010. "Just‐In‐Time Production, Work Organization And Absence Control," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(5), pages 460-483, September.
    3. John S. Heywood & Laurie A. Miller, 2015. "Schedule Flexibility, Family Friendly Policies and Absence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(6), pages 652-675, December.
    4. Wei Zhang & Huiying Sun & Simon Woodcock & Aslam H. Anis, 2017. "Valuing productivity loss due to absenteeism: firm-level evidence from a Canadian linked employer-employee survey," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-14, December.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/14113 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Benhenda, Asma, 2022. "Absence, substitutability and productivity: Evidence from teachers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    7. D.S. Possenriede & W.H.J. Hassink & J. Plantenga, 2014. "Does temporal and locational flexibility of work reduce absenteeism?," Working Papers 14-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. Darin F. Ullman, 2017. "The Effect of Medical Marijuana on Sickness Absence," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(10), pages 1322-1327, October.
    9. Elena Grinza & François Rycx, 2020. "The Impact of Sickness Absenteeism on Firm Productivity: New Evidence from Belgian Matched Employer–Employee Panel Data," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 150-194, January.
    10. Konstantinos Pouliakas & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2012. "The Effect of Variable Pay Schemes on Workplace Absenteeism," Research in Labor Economics, in: Research in Labor Economics, pages 109-157, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    11. Philippe Askenazy & Damien Cartron, 2020. "When Preventing Absenteeism Fuels Long‐Sickness Leave: The Case of a Leading Operator for Local Transport Services," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 58(1), pages 199-223, March.
    12. Nikolaos Georgantzis & Efi Vasileiou, 2014. "Are Dangerous Jobs Paid Better? European Evidence," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 163-192, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    13. David Marsden, 2010. "Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Collective Voice Regimes," CEP Discussion Papers dp1006, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    14. Gregor Bouville & David Alis, 2014. "The effects of lean organizational practices on employees' attitudes and workers' health: evidence from France," Post-Print halshs-01104687, HAL.
    15. Konstantinos, Pouliakas & Ioannis, Theodossiou, 2010. "An Inquiry Into the Theory, Causes and Consequences of Monitoring Indicators of Health and Safety At Work," MPRA Paper 20336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Marsden, David & Moriconi, Simone, 2009. "The value of rude health: employees' well being, absence and workplace performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24374, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Böckerman, Petri & Bryson, Alex & Ilmakunnas, Pekka, 2012. "Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 660-680.
    18. Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe & Wei, Xiangdong, 2008. "Teamwork, monitoring and absence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 676-690, December.
    19. Mette Gørtz & Elvira Andersson, 2014. "Child‐To‐Teacher Ratio And Day Care Teacher Sickness Absenteeism," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(12), pages 1430-1442, December.
    20. Ken Clark & Simon A. Peters & Mark Tomlinson, 2005. "The Determinants Of Lateness: Evidence From British Workers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 52(2), pages 282-304, May.
    21. repec:ehl:lserod:51587 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2009. "Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain," MPRA Paper 18238, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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