Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Collective Voice Regimes
This article examines the relationship between individual and collective employee voice, and management-led voice (appraisal), under contrasted collective voice regimes. In the first, collective workplace voice depends on voluntary recognition by the employer, and in the second, it is based on statutory rights. It is argued that in the first, individual and collective voice act as substitutes, and in the second they act as complements. Management-led voice is also influenced by whether the preceding forms are substitutes or complements. The argument is tested using data from the British and French workplace employment relations surveys for 2004, combining responses from employees and from management. Within country differences are used to aid identification. In conclusion, it finds broad support for the main hypothesis.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
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