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The Economics of Performance Appraisals

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  • Marc-Arthur Diaye

    (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

  • Nathalie Greenan

    (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

Abstract

Performance appraisals have become a widespread practice in OECD member countries. However, whereas the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evaluation receives a lot of attention, rmlevel performance appraisals are strikingly left outside of economic theory. The purpose of this paper is threefold: rst, to theoretically de ne what performance appraisals are; second, to analyze the e ects of incentive contracts on e ort and wage using performance appraisals; and third, to theoretically quantify the selection e ects driven by the implementation of performance appraisals.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2012. "The Economics of Performance Appraisals," Working Papers halshs-00856229, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00856229
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00856229
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stefan Bender & Julia Lane & Kathryn Shaw & Fredrik Andersson & Till von Wachter, 2008. "The Analysis of Firms and Employees: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bend08-1.
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    14. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan & Michal W. Urdanivia, 2008. "Subjective Evaluation of Performance and Evaluation Interview: Empirical Evidence from France," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Firms and Employees: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, pages 107-131 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rahma Daly & Marc-Arthur Diaye, 2017. "Do Performance Appraisals Decrease Employees’ Perception of Their Psychosocial Risks?," Documents de recherche 17-04, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.

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