Individual Employee Voice: Renegotiation and Performance Management in Public Services
Periodically, the 'zone of acceptance' within which management may use its authority to direct employees' work needs to be adapted to the changing needs of organisations. This article focuses especially on the non-codified elements of employees' work, such as those commonly the subject of 'psychological contracts', and considers the role of individual employee voice in the process of adaptation, and how it relates to more familiar forms of collective employee voice. It is argued that the process can be analysed as a form of integrative bargaining, and applies the framework from Walton and McKersie. Employee voice enters into this process by virtue of consideration of the respective goals and preferences of both parties. The element of employee voice may be very weak when new work goals and priorities are imposed unilaterally by management, and they may be strong when full consideration is given to the changing needs of both parties. Two examples from work on performance management in the public services are used to illustrate these processes. The article concludes with a discussion of the ways in which collective employee voice may help to reinforce individual level integrative negotiation. The article seeks to contribute to the recent work on why employers choose employee voice mechanisms by broadening the range of policies that should be taken into account, and in particular looking at the potential of performance management as one such form.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
|Date of revision:|
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- David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2006.
"Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
4675, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2006. "Pay for Performance Where Output is Hard to Measure: the Case of Performance Pay for School Teachers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0747, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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NBER Working Papers
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- David Marsden, 2004. "The role of performance-related pay in renegotiating the "effort bargain": the case of the British public service," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4036, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2006. "Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 22871, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David Marsden, 2004. "The Role of Performance-Related Pay in Renegotiating the â€œEffort Bargainâ€ : The Case of the British Public Service," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 57(3), pages 350-370, April.
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