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The end of national models in employment relations?

  • David Marsden
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    The erosion of a number of national systems of employment relations, and the evidence fromlarge scale workplace surveys has brought attention to the considerable diversity ofemployment systems within major economies. This essay applies the theory of evolutionarygames to explain the diffusion of different employment systems within national economies,and how they interact with established sectoral and national level institutions. This also helpsto explain potential tipping points in their expansion and retreat. Evidence to support theargument is taken from the British and French workplace employment relations surveys andthe European Working Conditions Survey.

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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48913/
    File Function: Open access version.
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    Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 48913.

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    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:48913
    Contact details of provider: Postal: LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.
    Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
    Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
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    1. Jacob R. Holm & Edward Lorenz & Bengt-�ke Lundvall & Antoine Valeyre, 2010. "Organizational learning and systems of labor market regulation in Europe," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 1141-1173, August.
    2. Kleiner, Morris M. & Krueger, Alan B., 2011. "Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 5505, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Marsden, David, 1999. "A Theory of Employment Systems: Micro-Foundations of Societal Diversity," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198294221.
    4. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
    5. David Metcalf & Kirstine Hansen & Andy Charlwood, 2001. "Unions and the Sword of Justice: Unions and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 176(1), pages 61-75, April.
    6. Christopher L. Erickson & Sanford M. Jacoby, 2003. "The Effect of Employer Networks on Workplace Innovation and Training," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(2), pages 203-223, January.
    7. David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2010. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(2), pages 235-283, 06.
    8. Paul Osterman, 2000. "Work reorganization in an era of restructuring: Trends in diffusion and effects on employee welfare," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 53(2), pages 179-196, January.
    9. Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2009. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," CEP Discussion Papers dp0941, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    10. Melvyn Coles & Joseph Lanfranchi & Ali Skalli & John Treble, 2007. "Pay, Technology, And The Cost Of Worker Absence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 268-285, 04.
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