IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/16560.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Battles Among Licensed Occupations: Analyzing Government Regulations on Labor Market Outcomes for Dentists and Hygienists

Author

Listed:
  • Morris M. Kleiner
  • Kyoung Won Park

Abstract

Occupational licensing is among the fastest-growing labor market institutions in the U.S. economy. One of the key features of occupational licensing is that the law determines who gets to do the work. In those cases where universally licensed occupations are both complements to and substitutes for one another in providing a service, the government determines who can do the tasks that are required for the consumer. In this study, we examine dentists and dental hygienists, who are both universally licensed and provide complementary services to patients, but may also be substitutes as service providers. We focus on the labor market implications of governmental requirements on permissible tasks and the supervision of hygienists' activities by dentists. Since there are elements of monopsony in the market we examine, we use the model as a guide for our analysis. We find that states that allow hygienists to be self-employed have about 10 percent higher earnings, and that dentists in those states have lower earnings and slower employment growth. Several sensitivity and falsification tests using other regulated and partially regulated occupations show that our licensing measures are generally robust to alternative specifications. Our estimates are consistent with the view that winning the policy and legal battle in the legislature and courts on the independence of work rules matters in the labor market for these occupations.

Suggested Citation

  • Morris M. Kleiner & Kyoung Won Park, 2010. "Battles Among Licensed Occupations: Analyzing Government Regulations on Labor Market Outcomes for Dentists and Hygienists," NBER Working Papers 16560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16560
    Note: LS
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16560.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pedro Carneiro & James J. Heckman & Edward Vytlacil, 2010. "Evaluating Marginal Policy Changes and the Average Effect of Treatment for Individuals at the Margin," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 377-394, January.
    2. Tanya Wanchek, 2009. "Dental Hygiene Regulation and Access to Care," Working Papers 2009-02, Center for Economic and Policy Studies, revised 23 Jul 2009.
    3. William M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, 1997. "Monopsony in the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 86-112, March.
    4. Erica L. Groshen, 1988. "Why do wages vary among employers?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 19-38.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stange, Kevin, 2014. "How does provider supply and regulation influence health care markets? Evidence from nurse practitioners and physician assistants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 1-27.
    2. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan," Working Papers 2013-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    3. Christina DePasquale and Kevin Stange, 2014. "Labor Supply Effects of Occupational Regulation: Evidence from the Nurse Licensure Compact," Emory Economics 1414, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
    4. Terance J. Rephann & Tanya Wanchek, 2012. "Filling the Gaps: Dentist Disparities along the Rural Urban Continuum," Working Papers 2012-02, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.
    5. Sara Markowitz & E. Kathleen Adams & Mary Jane Lewitt, PhD, CNM & Anne Dunlop, MD, 2016. "Competitive Effects of Scope of Practice Restrictions: Public Health or Public Harm?," NBER Working Papers 22780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Morris M. Kleiner & Allison Marier & Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, 2016. "Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 261-291.
    7. Marek Zapletal, 2017. "The Effects of Occupational Licensing Evidence from Detailed Business-Level Data," Working Papers 17-20, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    8. Timmons, Edward Joseph, 2017. "The effects of expanded nurse practitioner and physician assistant scope of practice on the cost of Medicaid patient care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 189-196.
    9. Manning, Alan, 2011. "Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
    10. Jing Cai & Morris M. Kleiner, 2016. "The Labor Market Consequences of Regulating Similar Occupations: The Licensing of Occupational and Physical Therapists," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 16-259, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    11. Dean Baker, 2016. "Working Paper: The Compensation of Highly Paid Professionals: How Much Is Rent?," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2016-13, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
    12. Alexander, Diane & Schnell, Molly, 2016. "Just What the Nurse Practitioner Ordered: Independent Prescriptive Authority and Population Mental Health," Working Paper Series WP-2017-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    13. repec:eee:jhecon:v:55:y:2017:i:c:p:201-218 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Thomas Buchmueller & Sarah Miller & Marko Vujicic, 2016. "How Do Providers Respond to Changes in Public Health Insurance Coverage? Evidence from Adult Medicaid Dental Benefits," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 70-102, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
    • J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16560. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: () or (Joanne Lustig). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.