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Regulated occupations in Italy: extent and labor market effects

Author

Listed:
  • Sauro Mocetti

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Lucia Rizzica

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Giacomo Roma

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

This work provides a descriptive assessment of regulated occupations in Italy and examines the impact of regulation on the labor market. First, we construct, on the basis of law provisions, a set of novel indicators measuring both the extensive and the intensive margin of regulation. We then show that regulated occupations represent a significant and increasing fraction of total employment (24%), their incidence being significantly larger among workers with a college degree (52%). Moreover, these occupations are characterized by lower mobility and entry rates and by a wage premium of about 9%, which raises to 18% for the professioni ordinistiche. Finally, we provide causal evidence that the reduction of entry requirements and the repeal of tariff restrictions lead to an increase in entry into regulated occupations and to a reduction of the wages of the incumbents.

Suggested Citation

  • Sauro Mocetti & Lucia Rizzica & Giacomo Roma, 2019. "Regulated occupations in Italy: extent and labor market effects," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 495, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_495_19
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    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2019-0495/QEF_495_19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bamieh, Omar & Cintolesi, Andrea, 2021. "Intergenerational transmission in regulated professions and the role of familism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 857-879.
    2. Rostam-Afschar Davud, 2020. "Inklusive Beschäftigungspolitik: Fakten, Herausforderungen und neue Ideen zur Regulierung von Berufen," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 69(2), pages 129-139, August.
    3. Giuseppe Rose & Francesco Mazzulla, 2023. "Relaxing Occupational Licensing In Italy: A Staggered Difference In Differences Analysis Using Balance-Sheet Data Of Italian Pharmacies," Working Papers 202302, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    4. Omar Bamieh & Andrea Cintolesi & Mario Pagliero, 2024. "Estimating the returns to occupational licensing: evidence from regression discontinuities at the bar exam," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1440, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Sauro Mocetti & Giacomo Roma & Enrico Rubolino, 2022. "Knocking on Parents’ Doors: Regulation and Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 57(2), pages 525-554.
    6. Nazim Belhocine & Mr. Daniel Garcia-Macia, 2020. "Identifying Service Market Reform Priorities in Italy," IMF Working Papers 2020/039, International Monetary Fund.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; occupation mobility; entry rate; wages;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General

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