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Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?

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  • Mario Pagliero

    (University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto)

Abstract

Occupational licensing regulations require workers in many different professions to obtain a special permit to work legally in their chosen field. Although professional associations argue that the only goal of professional licensing is to protect the public, occupational regulation may also reduce competition: for example, by reducing entry. This paper reviews the recent literature and policy developments on the subject, with a focus on the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Pagliero, 2019. "Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(1), pages 137-153, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09711-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09711-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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