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Law professions, low regulation: assessing notarial competition through (de)regulation indexes

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Abstract

The French notary profession has been transformed over the last ten years, leading to increased competition. However, regulatory indicators that initiated this process did not change. In other words, indicators have promoted and directly inspired regulatory changes that they fail to quantify. This paper questions the reasons for this failure by revisiting the methodology behind the indicators of professional regulation. It interrogates their double aim of quantifying regulation and giving insights for policymaking. Both lie in a representation of regulation on a competition continuum. Thus, the indicators can be interpreted equally as indicators of both regulation and deregulation. Challenging their positive dimension (regulation), we show that, in fact, they do not quantify professional regulation itself, but rather measure the distance from an ideal model in a "flat" world. Analysing their normative dimension (deregulation), we show that they often contradict the policies they are used to justify. These indicators can only promote complete deregulation or a one-size-fits-all model. Finally, we advocate for developing indicators more suitable for both economic analysis and policymaking, by adopting a more "legal markets-based" methodology for constructing indicators

Suggested Citation

  • Grégroire Massé, 2024. "Law professions, low regulation: assessing notarial competition through (de)regulation indexes," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 24004r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Dec 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24004r
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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