Information vs advertising in the market for hospital care
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DOI: 10.1007/s10754-007-9027-6
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Rosella Levaggi & Marcello Montefiori, 2013. "Patient selection in a mixed oligopoly market for health care: the role of the soft budget constraint," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(1), pages 49-70, March.
- Maithili R. P. Singh & Jugal Kishor, 2018. "The Corporate Image As A Weapon In The Attraction Of Prospective Employe," Working papers 2018-28-13, Voice of Research.
- Levaggi, Laura & Levaggi, Rosella, 2020. "Is there scope for mixed markets in the provision of hospital care?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
- Yasuo Sanjo, 2009. "Quality choice in a health care market: a mixed duopoly approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 10(2), pages 207-215, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Advertising; Reputation; I11; I18;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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