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The long-run earnings effects of winning a mayoral election

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Bertoni
  • Giorgio Brunello
  • Lorenzo Cappellari

    (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
    Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

  • Maria De Paola

Abstract

We estimate the effect of winning a mayoral election on long-run licit earnings, which plays a key role in the selection of local political leaders. We use Italian administrative social security data from 1995 to 2017 and a sharp regression discontinuity design based on close elections. Over a 15-year horizon, the average present discounted value of winning an election is equal to 35,000€, or 85 percent of the annual labor and social security earnings for the average candidate in our sample, a modest effect driven by the compensations for political service and concentrated during the first five years after the election. Net of compensations for service, this effect is negative during the first ten years after the election, and almost fades away afterwards. Differences in the political careers of winners and runners-up and a two-term limit rule on mayors’ office contribute to explain our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Cappellari & Maria De Paola, 2023. "The long-run earnings effects of winning a mayoral election," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def123, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def123
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    returns to office; political selection; revolving door; rent-seeking; close elections.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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