IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/buspol/v14y2013i4p1-26n2.html

Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach

Author

Listed:
  • Weymouth Stephen

    (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business, 501 Hariri Building, Washington, DC, 20057, USA)

Abstract

A large literature examines corporate political activity in the United States, but much less is known about firms’ lobbying activities and policy influence in developing countries. I argue that firm-level heterogeneity helps explain firms’ political behavior, while political institutions shape policymakers’ incentives to respond to business interests. The empirical analysis relies on the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, which covers over 20,000 firms operating in 42 developing and transition countries, to examine the determinants of lobbying and perceived policy influence. Multilevel estimates support the hypotheses that lobbying and influence increase with the firm’s size and market power. Additionally, I find that firms report greater policy influence in democracies than in non-democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Weymouth Stephen, 2013. "Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 1-26, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:1-26:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/bap-2012-0030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2012-0030
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bap-2012-0030?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 751-774, October.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Ugo, 2001. "Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 311-342, November.
    4. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2013. "Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(2), pages 362-376, May.
    5. Fan, C. Simon & Lin, Chen & Treisman, Daniel, 2009. "Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 14-34, February.
    6. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    7. Antonio Ciccone & Elias Papaioannou, 2007. "Red Tape and Delayed Entry," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 444-458, 04-05.
    8. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    9. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 407-438, July.
    10. Hansen, Wendy L. & Mitchell, Neil J., 2000. "Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 891-903, December.
    11. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2010. "Firm‐Level Determinants Of Political Influence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 233-256, November.
    12. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    13. Pol Antras & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(3), pages 552-580, June.
    14. Meghana Ayyagari & Asli Demirgüc-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, 2008. "How Well Do Institutional Theories Explain Firms' Perceptions of Property Rights?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(4), pages 1833-1871, July.
    15. Ozer Mine & Lee Seung-Hyun, 2009. "When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23, April.
    16. Salamon, Lester M. & Siegfried, John J., 1977. "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 1026-1043, September.
    17. Alt, James E. & Carlsen, Fredrik & Heum, Per & Johansen, Kåre, 1999. "Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 99-116, January.
    18. J Lawrence Broz & Jeffry Frieden & Stephen Weymouth, 2008. "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 55(3), pages 417-444, July.
    19. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, Enero-Abr.
    20. Klapper, Leora & Laeven, Luc & Rajan, Raghuram, 2006. "Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 591-629, December.
    21. Bernard, Andrew B. & Bradford Jensen, J., 1999. "Exceptional exporter performance: cause, effect, or both?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-25, February.
    22. Levon Barseghyan, 2008. "Entry costs and cross-country differences in productivity and output," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 145-167, June.
    23. Kim Jin-Hyuk, 2008. "Corporate Lobbying Revisited," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-25, September.
    24. Ozer, Mine & Lee, Seung-Hyun, 2009. "When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-21, April.
    25. Marianne Bertrand & Francis Kramarz, 2002. "Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1369-1413.
    26. Hall, Richard L. & Deardorff, Alan V., 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 69-84, February.
    27. repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
    28. Megumi Naoi & Ellis Krauss, 2009. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 874-892, October.
    29. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    30. Bonardi, Jean-Philippe & Holburn, Guy & Vanden Bergh, Rick, 2006. "Nonmarket performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities," MPRA Paper 14437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    31. Esty, Daniel C & Caves, Richard E, 1983. "Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity, and Success," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(1), pages 24-38, January.
    32. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
    33. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    34. John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    35. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
    36. Kennelly, Brendan & Murrell, Peter, 1991. "Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 21-40, April.
    37. Amy J Hillman & William P Wan, 2005. "The determinants of MNE subsidiaries' political strategies: evidence of institutional duality," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 36(3), pages 322-340, May.
    38. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-776, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Govorun, Andrei & Marques, Israel & Pyle, William, 2016. "The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 395-433, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars & Douhan, Robin, 2014. "Entrepreneurship policy and globalization," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 22-38.
    2. Ozer, Mine, 2010. "Top management teams and corporate political activity: Do top management teams have influence on corporate political activity?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(11), pages 1196-1201, November.
    3. Douhan, Robin & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization," Working Paper Series 807, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 23 Jul 2013.
    4. Sameeksha Desai & Johan E. Eklund & Emma Lappi, 2020. "Entry Regulation and Persistence of Profits in Incumbent Firms," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(3), pages 537-558, November.
    5. Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo, 2015. "Influencing public policymaking: Firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(13), pages 2021-2038, December.
    6. Philipp Lergetporer & Jens Ruhose & Lisa Simon, 2018. "Entry Barriers and the Labor Market Outcomes of Incumbent Workers: Evidence from a Deregulation Reform in the German Crafts Sector," CESifo Working Paper Series 7274, CESifo.
    7. Andrea Cintolesi & Sauro Mocetti & Giacomo Roma, 2024. "Productivity and entry regulation: evidence from the universe of firms," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1455, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Lee Branstetter & Francisco Lima & Lowell J. Taylor & Ana Venâncio, 2014. "Do Entry Regulations Deter Entrepreneurship and Job Creation? Evidence from Recent Reforms in Portugal," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 805-832, June.
    9. Jeffrey Macher & John Mayo, 2012. "The World of Regulatory Influence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 59-79, February.
    10. Mitton, Todd, 2008. "Institutions and concentration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 367-394, June.
    11. Susanne Prantl & Alexandra Spitz‐Oener, 2009. "How does entry regulation influence entry into self‐employment and occupational mobility?1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 17(4), pages 769-802, October.
    12. Martín Tobal, 2017. "Regulatory Entry Barriers, Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 76-97, February.
    13. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    14. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina & Yakovlev, Evgeny, 2007. "Deregulation of Business," CEPR Discussion Papers 6610, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    15. Rodolphe Durand & Robert M. Grant & Tammy L. Madsen & Sinziana Dorobantu & Aseem Kaul & Bennet Zelner, 2017. "Nonmarket strategy research through the lens of new institutional economics: An integrative review and future directions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 114-140, January.
    16. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    17. Lixin Colin Xu, 2011. "The Effects of Business Environments on Development: Surveying New Firm-level Evidence," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 26(2), pages 310-340, August.
    18. Pellegrino, Bruno & Zheng, Geoffery, 2024. "Quantifying the impact of red tape on investment: A survey data approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    19. Djankov, Simeon, 2008. "The Regulation of Entry: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 7080, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    20. Lisa Simon, 2019. "Microeconometric Analyses on Determinants of Individual Labour Market Outcomes," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 83, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:1-26:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.