IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v22y2010i3p233-256.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Firm-Level Determinants Of Political Influence

Author

Listed:
  • ALBERTO CHONG
  • MARK GRADSTEIN

Abstract

This paper uses a large cross-country survey of business firms to assess their influence on government policies. When controlling for endogeneity, we find that such an influence is associated with larger firms and to a lesser extent with government ownership, but not with the degree of competition. We also find that firms' perception of being politically influential is enhanced with the country's level of institutional quality. Copyright 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2010. "Firm-Level Determinants Of Political Influence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 233-256, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:233-256
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00355.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmidt, Peter & Strauss, Robert P, 1975. "Estimation of Models with Jointly Dependent Qualitative Variables: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 745-755, July.
    2. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    5. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages 632-652, November.
    6. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-373, October.
    7. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    8. repec:hrv:faseco:30747197 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David, 2006. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Political Connections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    2. Aisbett, Emma & McAusland, Carol, 2013. "Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 214-235.
    3. Jeffrey Macher & John Mayo, 2012. "The World of Regulatory Influence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 59-79, February.
    4. Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo, 2015. "Influencing public policymaking: Firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(13), pages 2021-2038, December.
    5. Weymouth Stephen, 2013. "Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 1-26, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:233-256. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.