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Political Participation and Entrepreneurial Initial Public Offerings in China

  • Feng, Xunan

    (Shanghai Jiaotong University)

  • Johansson, Anders C.

    ()

    (China Economic Research Center)

  • Zhang, Tianyu

    (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

This paper examines the value of political participation by private entrepreneurs in China. Using a unique sample of all initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms during 1994-2007 and political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs, we test the hypothesis that firms with entrepreneurs who participate in politics are able to exploit rent-seeking opportunities that normal firms do not have access to. We document that the long-run stock performance after the IPO of firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is superior to that of common entrepreneurial firms. Our results also show that political participation has a significant positive effect on change in operating performance and a negative effect on first-day returns. Moreover, we find that economic development and local institutions are important for this value effect. The difference in performance is even larger in regions characterized by more abundant rent-seeking opportunities, indicating that the value effect of political participation likely originates from rent seeking. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that political participation facilitates entrepreneurs’ rent seeking.

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File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hacerc/papers/hacerc2011-017.pdf
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Paper provided by China Economic Research Center, Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2011-17.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hacerc:2011-017
Contact details of provider: Postal: China Economic Research Center, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-8-736 90 00
Fax: +46-8-31 81 86
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/en/Research/Institutes/SCERI/

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