# Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

# Discussion Papers

Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014

Phone: 847/491-3527

Fax: 847/491-2530

Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/Email:

More information through EDIRC

Phone: 847/491-3527

Fax: 847/491-2530

Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/Email:

More information through EDIRC

**Order information:**

Email:

**To be notified about new items in this series:**fwalker@kellogg.northwestern.edu (see also NEP)

**For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Fran Walker)**

**Series handle:**repec:nwu:cmsems

**Citations RSS feed:**at CitEc

### Impact factors

- Simple (last 10 years)
- Recursive (10)
- Discounted (10)
- Recursive discounted (10)
- H-Index (10)
- Aggregate (10)

**Access and download statistics**

**Top item:**

- By citations
- By downloads (last 12 months)

### 1991

**961 The Afternoon Effect***by*R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent**960 The Correlation of Durations in Multivariate Hazard Rate Models***by*Gerard J. van den Berg & Ton Steerneman**959 Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services***by*Asher Wolinsky**958 Arbitrage***by*Thomas A. Rietz**957 Parallel Search: An Application to R & D***by*Tara Viswanath**956 Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis***by*Roger B. Myerson**955R Indeterminacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Externalities***by*Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini**954 Competitive Limit Pricing Under Imperfect Information***by*Kyle Bagwell**953 Threshold Externalities and Economic Development: A Note***by*Michele Boldrin**952 Simulations and Spatial Voting Methods***by*Scott E. Page**951 The Capital Market***by*Andrew F. Newman**950 Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard***by*Steven A. Matthews**949 Duration of Debt Overhang with Two Lender Banks***by*Jacek Prokop**948 Information Sources and Equilibrium Wage Outcomes***by*Dale T. Mortensen & Tara Vishwanath**947 Imperfect Competition***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**946 Dynamics of International Debt Overhang with Two Lender Banks***by*Jacek Prokop**945 A Game Theoretical Approach to the International Debt Overhang***by*Mamoru Kaneko & Jacek Prokop**944 Linear Measures, the Gini Index and the Income-Equality Tradeoff***by*Elchanan Ben Porath & Itzhak Gilboa**943 Rationality and Ascriptive Science***by*Itzhak Gilboa**942 The Capital Structure of Regulated Firms***by*Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber**941R Efficiency in Bargaining with Information Externalities***by*Daniel F. Spulber**940 Custom Versus Fashion: Hysteresis and Limit Cycles in a Random Matching Game***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**939 Equilibrium Unemployment Cycles***by*Dale T. Mortensen**938 Sufficient Statistics***by*Donald G. Saari**937 Social Conflict***by*Jess Benhabib & Aldo Rustichini**936 Monopoly Pricing Strategies***by*Daniel F. Spulber**935 Absorbent Stable Sets***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet**933 Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**932 Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems***by*Debra J. Aron & Paul Olivella**931 Toward a Theory of International Currency***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**930 A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search***by*Michele Boldrin**929 Equilibrium in Non-Partitioning Strategies***by*Robert J. Weber**928 Proportional Representation***by*Roger B. Myerson**926 Private-Beliefs Equilibrium***by*Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer**924 Updating Ambiguous Beliefs***by*Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler**921 Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality***by*Kyle Bagwell**920 Price Regulation and Quality of Service***by*Morton I. Kamien & Daniel R. Vincent**917 The Timing of Entry into New Markets***by*Debra J. Aron**909 Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates***by*Daniel R. Vincent**1067 Monotonicity of Solution Sets for Parameterized Optimization Problems***by*Leslie M. Marx**1065 An Approach to Equilibrium Selection***by*Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama**1030 Custom Versus Fashion: Path-Dependence and Limit Cycles in a Random Matching Game***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**1010 Conditioning and Aggregation of Preferences***by*Costis Skiadas**1007 Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance***by*Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss**1001 Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games***by*Jeroen M. Swinkels

### 1990

**970 An Approach to Equilibrium Selection***by*Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama**966 Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms***by*Matthew O. Jackson**965 Implementing Social Choice Functions: A New Look at Some Impossibility Results***by*Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava**934 Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**927 An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Way Elections***by*Robert Forsythe**925 Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium***by*Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer**923 Philosophical Applications of Kolmogorov's Complexity Measure***by*Itzhak Gilboa**922 Global Games***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer**919 Dividing a Cake by Majority: The Simplest Equilibria***by*David Baron & Ehud Kalai**916 (s,S) Equilibria in Stochastic Games with an Application to Product Innovations***by*Prajit K. Dutta & Aldo Rustichini**915 Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games***by*Karl Iorio & Alejandro M. Manuelli**914 Convergence to Price-Taking Behavior in a Simple Market***by*Aldo Rustichini**912 Evolutionary Stability in Games with Equivalent Strategies***by*Karl Schlag**911 Occupational Choice and the Process of Development***by*Abhijit V. Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman**910 Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price***by*Kenneth Hendricks**908 The Aggregate Excess Demand Function and Other Aggregation Procedures***by*Donald G. Saari**907 Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory***by*Roger B. Myerson**906 Viscous Population Equilibria***by*Roger B. Myerson**905 Stochastic Dominance***by*Ricard Torres**904 Overhead Allocation and Incentives for Cost Minimization in Defense Procurement***by*William P. Rogerson**903 Advertising and Coordination***by*Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey**902 An Informationally More Efficient Endowment Game***by*Lu Hong & Scott E. Page**901 Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment***by*Ehud Kalai**900 Liquidity***by*Timothy S. Fuerst**899 A Generalized Theorem of the Maximum***by*Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere**898 Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly***by*Kyle Bagwell**897 The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects***by*Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman**896 A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept***by*Jose Luis Ferreira**895 Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium***by*Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer**894 Innovation and Product Differentiation***by*Prajit K. Dutta**893 Modeling Competitive Behavior***by*Daniel R. Vincent**892R Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria***by*Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite**891 Core Convergence Without Monotone Preferences or Free Disposal***by*Alejandro Manelli**890 A Model of Computing with Human Agents***by*Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter**889 The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to 'Waste' Corporate Value***by*Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman**888 Capacity, Entry and Forward Induction***by*Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey**887 A Model of Random Matching***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui**886 Vintage Capital, Investment and Growth***by*Jess Benhabib & Aldo Rustichini**884 A Temporal and Spatial Equilibrium Analysis of Commuter Parking***by*Richard Arnott**883 Human Capital, Product Quality, and Growth***by*Nancy L. Stokey**882 Implementing A Public Project and Distributing Its Costs***by*Matthew Jackson & Herve Moulin**881 Advertising Signals of Product Quality***by*Steven A Matthews & Doron Fertig**880 Trading Games With Asymmetric Information***by*Francoise Forges**879 Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation***by*Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd & Ehud Kalai**878 Increasing Returns, Industrialization and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**876 Managerial Incentives in an Entrepreneurial Stock Market Model***by*Richard E. Kihlstrom & Steven A. Matthews**875 The Mathematical Appendix to Residential Investment and the Current Account***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**874 Learning from Mistakes: A Note on Just-in-Time Systems***by*Carlos Ocana & Eitan Zemel**873 Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem***by*William P. Rogerson**872 Risky R&D in Oligopolistic Product Markets***by*Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger**871 Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model***by*Michael Suk-Young Chwe**870 Aggregation of Semiorders: Intransitive Indifference Makes a Difference***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Robert Lapson**867 Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility***by*Chaim Fershtman & Zvi Safra & Daniel Vincent**866 Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies***by*Chaim Fershtman & Morton I. Kamien**865 Decentralized Dynamic Processes for Finding Equilibrium***by*Stanley Reiter & Carl P. Simon**1131 Capacity***by*Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey**1035 Merging Economic Forecasts***by*Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer

### 1989

**913 The Logit as a Model of Product Differentiation: Further Results and Extensions***by*Simon P. Anderson & Andre de Palma**885 Location Equilibria Under Alternative Solution Concepts***by*Simon P. Anderson**877 Risk-Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution***by*Abhijit Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman**869 The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Oligopolistic Industries***by*Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger**868 The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly***by*Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger**864 Does Providing Information to Drivers Reduce Traffic Congestion?***by*Richard Arnott**863 A Lower Bound for the Dimension of the Message Space of the Decentralized Mechanisms Realizing a Given Goal***by*Pengyuan Chen**862 Communication Equilibria with Large State Spaces***by*Kevin D. Cotter**860 Equilibrium Wage Differentials and Employer Size***by*Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen**859 Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence***by*Alejandro Manelli**858 The Strength of a Little Perfection***by*Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme**857 Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games with Differential Information***by*Aldo Rustichini & M. Ali Khan**856 Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent***by*Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere**855 Quasi-Values on Subspaces***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Monderer**854 A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Binary Stochastic Choice Problem***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Monderer**853 The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel**852 Optimal Depreciation Schedules for Regulated Utilities***by*William P. Rogerson**851 Incentives, the Budgetary Process, and Inefficiently Low Production Rates in Defense Procurement***by*William P. Rogerson**850 Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**849 The Volume and Composition of Trade Between Rich and Poor Countries***by*Nancy L. Stokey**848 Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society***by*Akihiko Matsui**847 A Note on the Consistency of Game Theory***by*Itzhak Gilboa**846 Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games***by*Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler**845 Strikes and Deadline Effects in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment***by*Chaim Fershtman & Daniel J. Seidman**844 Noisy Search and the Diamond Paradox***by*Chaim Fershtman & Arthur Fishman**843 Search and Price Dispersion in an Inflationary Economy***by*Chaim Fershtman & Arthur Fishman**842 Consistency of Decision Processes***by*Donald Saari**841 Players' Observation, Deductive Knowledge and Information Partitions***by*Ko Nishihara**840 Correlated Equilibria with Payoff Uncertainty***by*Kevin D. Cotter**839 Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring***by*Pau Olivella**838 Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret***by*Daniel R. Vincent**837 Discounting Versus Undiscounting in Dynamic Programming***by*Ehud Lehrer & Dov Monderer**836 Numerical Representations of Imperfectly Ordered Preferences (A Unified Geometric Exposition***by*Avraham Beja & Itzhak Gilboa**835 The Value of Information -- An Axiomatic Approach***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer**834 Dynamic Housing Market Equilibrium with Taste Heterogeneity***by*Alex Anas & Richard Arnott**833 Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms***by*Matthew 0. Jackson**832 Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships***by*Daniel R. Vincent**831 Coordination Failure and Long Run Growth***by*Hiroshi Osano**830 On the Design of Complex Organizations and Distributive Algorithms***by*Donald G. Saari**829 Oligopoly Limit Pricing***by*Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey**828 Toward an Endogenous Central Place Theory***by*Andre de Palma & Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou**827 Serial Correlation of Sunspot Equilibria (Rational Bubbles) in Two Popular Models of Monetary Economies***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**826 Complicated Topological Structure of the Set of Equilibrium Prices***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**823 Relationship Admitting Families of Candidates***by*Donald Saari**821 The Borda Dictionary***by*Donald G. Saari**820 Calculus and Extensions of Arrow's Theorem***by*Donald Saari**819 Social Stability and Equilibrium***by*Donald Saari**818 A Necessary but Insufficient Condition for the Stochastic Binary Choice Problem***by*Itzhak Gilboa**817 Collusion in Auctions***by*Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter**816 On a Representation of a Relation by a Measure***by*Ehud Lehrer**814 Equilibrium in Competing Networks with Differentiated Products***by*Andre de Palma & Luc Leruth**807 Random Reservation Prices and Bidding Behavior in OCS Drainage Auctions***by*Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter & Richard H. Spady**801 A Theory of Managed Trade***by*Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger**1012 Continuous Time Research and Development Investment and Innovation: Effects on Price and Dividend Paths***by*Thomas A. Rietz

### 1988

**918 Dynamic Externalities***by*Michele Boldrin**861 Capacity-Constrained Price Competition When Unit Costs Differ***by*Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock**825 Endogenous Price Fluctuations in an Optimizing Model of Monetary Economy***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**824 Economic Organization of Trading Relationships: Hierarchies and Asset Ownership***by*Birger Wernerfelt**822 A Comment on the Logic of 'Agreeing to Disagree' Type Results***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**815 Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings***by*Asher Wolinsly**813 Endogenous Price Fluctuations in an Optimizing Model of a Monetary Economy***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**812 A Theory of Sectoral Adjustment***by*Kiminori Matsuyama**811 Equilibrium Wage Distrihutions: A Synthesis***by*Dale T. Mortensen**810 The Persistence and Indeterminacy of Unemployment in Search Equilibrium***by*Dale T. Mortensen**809 Real Business Cycles in a Dynamic Labor Contract Equilibrium***by*Hiroshi Osano**808 High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality***by*Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan**806 Calculating the Cost of Capital for the Purposes of Input Substitution***by*William P. Rogerson**805 Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Model***by*Steven A. Matthews**804 Efficient Sequential Bargaining***by*Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere**803 Small Talk and Cooperation A Note on Bounded Rationality***by*Eitan Zemel**802 The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition***by*Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang**800 Internal Correlation in Repeated Games***by*Ehud Lehrer**799 Competitively Cost Advantageous Mergers and Monopolization***by*Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang**797 A Note on Fiscal Policy Under Flexible Exchange Rates***by*Pekka Ahtiala**796 Mechanism Design***by*Roger B. Myerson**795 Involuntary Unemployment and the Threat to Shirking Workers***by*Hiroshi Osano**794 The Potential Disadvantage of Becoming Too Large In Duopolistic Industry***by*Chaim Fershtman & Eitan Muller**793 The Nature of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction***by*Steven R. Williams**792 Corporate Spinoffs in an Agency Framework***by*Debra J. Aron**791 Full Bayesian Implementation***by*Matthew O. Jackson**789 On The Order of Eliminating Dominated Strategies***by*Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel**787 Advertising, Coordination, and Signaling***by*Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey**786 Information Leakage Forces Cooperation***by*Akihiko Matsui**785 Bertrand Competition with Subcontracting***by*Morton I. Kamien**784 Stationary Sequential Equilibria in Bargaining With Two-Sided Incomplete Information***by*Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere**782 A Theory of Voting Equilibria***by*Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber**781 Similarity of Correlated Equilibria***by*Kevin Cotter**780 Public Utility Pricing and Capacity Choice Under Risk: A Rational Expectations Approach***by*Stephen Coate & John C. Panzer**779 On Existence of a Nash Equilibrium Point in N-Person Nunzero Sum Stochastic Jump Differential Games***by*Birger Wernerfelt**778 Market Frictions and Posted Prices***by*Birger Wernerfelt**777 Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Eitan Zemel**776 Resale-Proof Trades of Information***by*Mikio Nakayama**775 Bargaining with Common Values***by*Daniel R. Vincent**774 Partially-Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium In A Competitive Economy***by*Lawrence M. Ausubel**773 Price Leadership***by*Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock**772 Dynamic Monopoly Power When Search is Costly***by*Kyle Bagwell & Michael Peters**771 Quality vs. Quantity in Military Procurement: An Organizational Theory of Decision Bias***by*William P. Rogerson**770 Dynamic Auctions***by*Daniel R. Vincent