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Simple and Clever Decision Rules in Single Population Evolutionary Models

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  • William H. Sandholm

Abstract

This paper compares two decision rules available to myopic players who are repeatedly randomly matched to play a 2 x 2 symmetric game. Players using the simple decision rule evaluate the strategies by comparing their current playoffs to those of an opponent currently playing the other strategy, while those following the clever decision rule assess the strategies under the assumption that opponents' actions are fixed. It is shown that while populations of simple players can fail to learn to play Nash equilibria or even dominant strategy equilibria, populations of clever players always learn to play approximate Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • William H. Sandholm, 1996. "Simple and Clever Decision Rules in Single Population Evolutionary Models," Discussion Papers 1158, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1158
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rhode, Paul & Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 443-449, March.
    2. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
    3. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandholm, William H. & Pauzner, Ady, 1998. "Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 84-120, January.

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