Decomposition and Representation of Coalitional Games
A coalitional game is a real-valued set function v defined on an algebra F of subsets of a space X such that v(0)=0. We prove the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between coalitional games bounded with respect to the composition norm and countably additive measures defined on an appropriate space.
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- Schmeidler, David, 1989.
"Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,"
Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
- David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1995.
"Canonical Representation of Set Functions,"
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