Sovereign Debt: Forgiving and Forgetting Reconsidered
In this note we show that even if after default a sovereign can make deposits on a Swiss bank account, the exclusion from future debt is sufficient to deter a patient country from default. In contrast to the work by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we assume that there is a fixed set of standard assets on the world financial markets in which the country can trade. In this setting the exclusion from future borrowing may seriously limit a country's ability to smooth consumption. Therefore the traditional reputational logic can be applied.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989.
"Sustainable plans and debt,"
125, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988.
"Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-97, December.
- Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.