Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade
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- Neeman, Zvika, 1996. "Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 77-96, September.
References listed on IDEAS
- D. Samet, 1987. "Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree," Discussion Papers 749, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1993.
"Custom versus fashion: path-dependence and limit cycles in a random matching game,"
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
82, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Zvika Neeman, 1993. "A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs," Discussion Papers 1029, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
- Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 190-207, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Robin Hanson, 2003. "For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 105-123.
- Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010.
"Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, pages 264-286.
- Ludovic Renou & Karl Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Economics Working Papers 1087, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.
- Angrisani Marco & Guarino Antonio & Huck Steffen & Larson Nathan C, 2011.
"No-Trade in the Laboratory,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, pages 1-58.
- Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Steffen Huck & Nathan Larson, 2008. "No-Trade in the Laboratory," CESifo Working Paper Series 2436, CESifo Group Munich.
- Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Steffen Huck & Nathan Larson, 2008. "No-Trade in the Laboratory," WEF Working Papers 0045, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
- Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2003. ""Agreeing to disagree" type results: a decision-theoretic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 849-861, November.
- Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2015. "Robert Louis Stevenson's Bottle Imp: A strategic analysis," MPRA Paper 64639, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Romeo Matthew Balanquit, 2016. "Common Belief Revisited," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201608, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
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