IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/64639.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Robert Louis Stevenson's Bottle Imp: A strategic analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

Abstract

The background of Stevenson's story is viewed as a stylized model of participation in a financial pyramid. You are invited to participate in a dubious activity. If you refuse, you neither gain nor lose anything. If you accept, you will gain if you are able to find somebody who will take your place on exactly the same conditions, but suffer a loss otherwise. The catch is that there is a finite number of discrete steps at which the substitution can be done, so the agent who joins in at the last step inevitably loses. Clearly, rational agents will not agree to participate at any step. However, an arbitrarily small probability of a "bailout," in which case that last agent will get the same gain as every other participant, plus an appropriately asymmetric structure of private information, change everything, so the proposal will be accepted in a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, provided there are sufficiently many steps ahead.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2015. "Robert Louis Stevenson's Bottle Imp: A strategic analysis," MPRA Paper 64639, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:64639
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64639/1/MPRA_paper_64639.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kocherlakota, Narayana, 2008. "Injecting rational bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 218-232, September.
    2. Barlevy, Gadi, 2014. "A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 459-505.
    3. Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 173-204, January.
    4. Dulleck, Uwe & Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "The absent-minded centipede," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 309-315, September.
    5. Miao, Jianjun, 2014. "Introduction to economic theory of bubbles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 130-136.
    6. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    7. Sophie Moinas & Sebastien Pouget, 2013. "The Bubble Game: An Experimental Study of Speculation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1507-1539, July.
    8. Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K., 2001. "Growth Cycles and Market Crashes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 96(1-2), pages 13-39, January.
    9. Tirole, Jean, 1982. "On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1163-1181, September.
    10. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
    11. Patrick Leoni, 2009. "Market crashes, speculation and learning in financial markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 217-229, May.
    12. Neeman, Zvika, 1996. "Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 77-96, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhang, Mu & Zheng, Jie, 2017. "A robust reference-dependent model for speculative bubbles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 232-258.
    2. Doblas-Madrid, Antonio, 2016. "A finite model of riding bubbles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 154-162.
    3. Bidian, Florin, 2015. "Portfolio constraints, differences in beliefs and bubbles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 317-326.
    4. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Angrisani Marco & Guarino Antonio & Huck Steffen & Larson Nathan C, 2011. "No-Trade in the Laboratory," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-58, April.
    6. Ceccantoni, Giulia & Tarola, Ornella & Zanaj, Skerdilajda, 2018. "Green Consumption and Relative Preferences in a Vertically Differentiated International Oligopoly," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 129-139.
    7. Bosi, Stefano & Le Van, Cuong & Pham, Ngoc-Sang, 2017. "Asset bubbles and efficiency in a generalized two-sector model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 37-48.
    8. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.),Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    9. John R. Conlon, 2015. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 141-161, February.
    10. Dow, James & Han, Jungsuk, 2015. "Contractual incompleteness, limited liability and asset price bubbles," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 383-409.
    11. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellman, Ziv, 2019. "No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 161-184.
    12. Aragón, Nicolás & Roulund, Rasmus Pank, 2020. "Confidence and decision-making in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 688-718.
    13. Carlos J. Perez & Manuel Santos, 2017. "On the Dynamics of Speculation in a Model of Bubbles and Manias," Working Papers 2017-02, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    14. Milo Bianchi & Philippe Jehiel, 2008. "Bubbles and crashes with partially sophisticated investors," Working Papers halshs-00586045, HAL.
    15. Bengui, Julien & Phan, Toan, 2018. "Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 280-314.
    16. Amil Dasgupta & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000368, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Jie Zheng, 2008. "Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000038, David K. Levine.
    18. Stefano Bosi & Cuong Le Van & Ngoc-Sang Pham, 2016. "Asset bubbles and efficiency in a generalized two-sector model," Post-Print halshs-01316876, HAL.
    19. Moinas, Sophie & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "The Bubble Game : An experimental Study of Speculation (An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title "The Rational and Irrational Bubbles : an Experiment")," IDEI Working Papers 560, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2012.
    20. Mathieu Boullot, 2017. "Secular Stagnation, Liquidity Trap and Rational Asset Price Bubbles," Working Papers halshs-01295012, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial pyramid; partitional information structure; game of incomplete information; game of perfect information;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:64639. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.