Hempel, Good and Bayes
This paper analyzes some decision/belief paradoxes from a Bayesian viewpoint, focusing on Hempel's "paradox of confirmation" and Good's variation of it. It is shown that a straightforward Bayesian analysis revolves the paradoxes discussed. These exampmles are used to support the view tha twhat the Bayesian paradigm does best is to provide a coherent and intuitive representation of belief.
|Date of creation:||May 1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014|
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1995.
"Case-Based Decision Theory,"
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