IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Coordination and the Structure of Firms


  • Stanley Reiter


This paper presents a model in which organizational structure emerges as the solution of an optimization problem. The objective is to compute the desired decisions in a given class of economic environments, and the constraints express limitation on the abilities of agents to compute and communicate. The "variable" to be solved for, whose values are interpreted as different organizational structures, is a type of directed graph (an EADAG). Depending on its structure, a solution graph may represent organization into one or more informationally independent units. The structure of solution graphs is derived from the nature of the coordination problem as expressed by the desired decision function.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley Reiter, 1995. "Coordination and the Structure of Firms," Discussion Papers 1121, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1121

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, July.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    3. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    4. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-157, January.
    5. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
    6. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9410002, EconWPA.
    7. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    9. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    10. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9410002, EconWPA.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Mookherjee, D. & Reichelstein, S., 1996. "Budgeting and Hierarchical Control," Papers 71, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    2. Ioannides, Yannis M., 2012. "Complexity and organizational architecture," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 193-202.
    3. Van Zandt, Timothy, 2003. "Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation with Quadratic Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. John H. Miller, 1995. "Evolving Information Processing Organizations," Working Papers 95-06-053, Santa Fe Institute.
    5. repec:spr:grdene:v:18:y:2009:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9146-6 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.