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Citations for "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements"

by Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington

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  1. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2009. "Information and the hold-up problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 405-423.
  2. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
  3. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
  4. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4et5cqo2b89, Sciences Po.
  5. Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 22-39, January.
  7. Chakravarty, Surajeet & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Construction Contracts (or: "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?")," IZA Discussion Papers 2125, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Giacomo De Luca, 2008. "Strategic Registration of Voters: The Chilean Case," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 08-17, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  9. Tsai Tsung-Sheng & Kung Sheng-Chiao, 2011. "Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, December.
  10. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2003. "Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 287-318.
  12. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Optimal tenant protection," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-92, January.
  13. Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," Microeconomics 9705002, EconWPA.
  14. Matthew Ellman, 2004. "Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments," Working Papers 150, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  15. Christoph Lülfesmann, 2001. "Limited Liability and Option Contracts in Models with Sequential Investments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
  16. Watson, Joel & Wignall, Chris, 2009. "Hold-Up and Durable Trading Opportunities," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt8p8284wg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  17. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Tao, Zhigang, 1998. "Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 391-413, December.
  18. Schwartz, Alan & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4jr3g3h7, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  19. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  20. Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Reputation for quality and adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-59.
  21. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  22. Guriev Sergei, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-32, August.
  23. Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2015. "Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2141-82, July.
  24. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Oll, Grete, 2014. "Opportunistic Disclosure in the Inter-Organizational Relationships," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 21/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  26. Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
  27. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
  28. Chongwoo Choe, 2006. "Optimal CEO Compensation: Some Equivalence Results," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 171-201, January.
  29. Dutta, Mousumi & Husain, Zakir, 2012. "Use of hospital services and socio-economic status in urban India: Does health insurance ensure equitable outcomes?," MPRA Paper 40055, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & K. Sivaramakrishnan., . "The Interaction between Decision and Control Problems and the Value of Information," Corporate Finance & Organizations _016, Ohio State University.
  31. Mugisha, Silver, 2007. "Effects of incentive applications on technical efficiencies: Empirical evidence from Ugandan water utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 225-233, December.
  32. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
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