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Optimal tenant protection

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  • Seshimo, Hiroyuki
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166-0462(02)00002-9
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Regional Science and Urban Economics.

    Volume (Year): 33 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 59-92

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:33:y:2003:i:1:p:59-92
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec

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    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
    3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-932, September.
    4. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991. "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer.
    5. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1992. "On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 280-305, April.
    6. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn.
    7. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, 1990. "Contract types in the property market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 5-22, June.
    8. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    9. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
    10. De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 22-39, January.
    11. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Miki Seko & Kazuto Sumita, 2007. "Japanese Housing Tenure Choice and Welfare Implications after the Revision of the Tenant Protection Law," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 357-383, October.
    2. Iwata, Shinichiro & Yamaga, Hisaki, 2008. "Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 201-211, September.
    3. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2014. "Adverse selection versus hold up: Tenure choice, tenancy protection and equilibrium in housing markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 39-55.

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