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Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality

  • Iwata, Shinichiro
  • Yamaga, Hisaki

This paper considers two tenure modes--owner- and renter-occupied housing--and models the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on single-family housing quality. We show that both rental externality and tenure security reduce renter-occupied housing quality when the user's utilization, which reduces the quality of the accommodation, and the owner's maintenance, which raises quality, are substitutes. Using single-family housing data in Japan, we obtain empirical results that are consistent with theoretical predictions. These results indicate that conventional wisdom--that the quality of renter-occupied housing is lower than that of owner-occupied housing--is supported for single-family housing in Japan.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJR-4SYCPTM-1/2/08fa0944cf179dfd608bd91999fd560f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Housing Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 201-211

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:17:y:2008:i:3:p:201-211
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622881

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  1. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Optimal tenant protection," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-92, January.
  2. Seko, Miki & Sumita, Kazuto, 2007. "Effects of government policies on residential mobility in Japan: Income tax deduction system and the Rental Act," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-188, June.
  3. Moon, Choon-Geol & Stotsky, Janet G, 1993. "The Effect of Rent Control on Housing Quality Change: A Longitudinal Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 1114-48, December.
  4. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, 1990. "Contract types in the property market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 5-22, June.
  5. Gyourko, Joseph & Linneman, Peter, 1990. "Rent controls and rental housing quality: A note on the effects of New York City's old controls," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 398-409, May.
  6. John Harding & Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, 2000. "Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing Than Renters?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 28(4), pages 663-681.
  7. Dean H. Gatzlaff & Richard K. Green & David C. Ling, 1997. "Cross-Tenure Differences in Home Maintenance and Appreciation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(3), pages 328-342.
  8. Sims, David P., 2007. "Out of control: What can we learn from the end of Massachusetts rent control?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 129-151, January.
  9. Henderson, J Vernon & Ioannides, Yannis M, 1983. "A Model of Housing Tenure Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 98-113, March.
  10. Benjamin, John D & de la Torre, Cris & Musumeci, Jim, 1995. "Controlling the Incentive Problems in Real Estate Leasing," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 177-91, March.
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