Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality
This paper considers two tenure modes--owner- and renter-occupied housing--and models the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on single-family housing quality. We show that both rental externality and tenure security reduce renter-occupied housing quality when the user's utilization, which reduces the quality of the accommodation, and the owner's maintenance, which raises quality, are substitutes. Using single-family housing data in Japan, we obtain empirical results that are consistent with theoretical predictions. These results indicate that conventional wisdom--that the quality of renter-occupied housing is lower than that of owner-occupied housing--is supported for single-family housing in Japan.
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