IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Alas, my home is my castle: On the cost of house ownership as a screening device

  • Arnold, Lutz G.
  • Babl, Andreas

This paper analyzes a model in which housing tenure choice serves as a means of screening households with different utilization rates. If the proportion of low-utilization types is small, there is a separating equilibrium at which tenure choice acts as a screening device: consistent with empirical evidence, low-utilization households buy a house, while high-utilization types rent. Otherwise, there is a pooling equilibrium. The reason why, contrary to standard screening models, a pooling equilibrium possibly exists is indivisibility of home ownership, which makes it a very costly screening device. Introducing partial ownership restores the standard results: non-existence of a pooling equilibrium and possible non-existence of equilibrium.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 81 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 57-64

in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:81:y:2014:i:c:p:57-64
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
  2. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2005. "Contract theory," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9543, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Hubert, Franz, 1995. "Contracting with costly tenants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 631-654, October.
  4. John Benjamin & Chris de la Torre & Jim Musumeci, 1998. "Rationales for Real Estate Leasing versus Owning," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 15(3), pages 223-238.
  5. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1989. " Adverse Selection in a Model of Real Estate Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 499-508, June.
  6. Grossman, Sanford J & Laroque, Guy, 1990. "Asset Pricing and Optimal Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Illiquid Durable Consumption Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 25-51, January.
  7. Posey, Lisa L. & Yavas, Abdullah, 2001. "Adjustable and Fixed Rate Mortgages as a Screening Mechanism for Default Risk," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 54-79, January.
  8. Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection," Discussion Paper Serie A 82, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. John Harding & Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, 2000. "Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing Than Renters?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 28(4), pages 663-681.
  10. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  11. Andrew Caplin & Sewin Chan & Charles Freeman & Joseph Tracy, 1997. "Housing Partnerships: A New Approach to a Market at a Crossroads," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032430, June.
  12. Brueckner, Jan K, 2000. "Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 251-74, May.
  13. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September.
  14. Arnold, Lutz G., 2005. "On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 403, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
  15. Robert M. Mooradian & Shiawee X. Yang, 2002. "Commercial Real Estate Leasing, Asymmetric Information, and Monopolistic Competition," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 293-315.
  16. Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, 2011. "Multidimensional Screening in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 287-307, 06.
  17. Thomas J. Miceli, 1989. "Housing Rental Contracts and Adverse Selection with an Application to the Rent-Own Decision," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(4), pages 403-421.
  18. Todd Sinai & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2005. "Owner-occupied housing as a hedge against rent risk," Working Papers 05-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  19. Henderson, J Vernon & Ioannides, Yannis M, 1983. "A Model of Housing Tenure Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 98-113, March.
  20. Stephen Malpezzi & Larry Ozanne & Thomas G. Thibodeau, 1987. "Microeconomic Estimates of Housing Depreciation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 63(4), pages 372-385.
  21. Dean H. Gatzlaff & Richard K. Green & David C. Ling, 1998. "Cross-Tenure Differences in Home Maintenance and Appreciation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 74(3), pages 328-342.
  22. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  23. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, 1998. "Mortgage Choice: What's the Point?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 173-205.
  24. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:81:y:2014:i:c:p:57-64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.