A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities
Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss  is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura  to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063|
Phone: (860) 486-4889
Fax: (860) 486-4463
Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
- Ling, David C. & Wachter, Susan M., 1998. "Information Externalities and Home Mortgage Underwriting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 317-332, November.
- Calem Paul & Stutzer Michael, 1995. "The Simple Analytics of Observed Discrimination in Credit Markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 189-212, July.
- Avery, Robert B. & Beeson, Patricia E. & Sniderman, Mark S., 1999. "Neighborhood Information and Home Mortgage Lending," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 287-310, March.
- Stephen Ross & AKM Rezaul Hossain, 2004. "A Direct Test of the Lang and Nakamura Hypothesis of Information Externalities over Space," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 398, Econometric Society.
- Brueckner, Jan K, 2000. "Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 251-274, May.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Harrison, David M., 2001. "The Importance of Lender Heterogeneity in Mortgage Lending," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 285-309, March.
- Ben-Shahar, Danny & Feldman, David, 2003. "Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 157-178, March-May.
- Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
- Calem, Paul S, 1996. "Mortgage Credit Availability in Low- and Moderate-Income Minority Neighborhoods: Are Information Externalities Critical?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 71-89, July.
- Paul S. Calem & Michael J. Stutzer, 1995. "The simple analytics of observed discrimination in credit markets," Working Papers 95-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark McConnel)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.