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Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market

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  • Ben-Shahar, Danny
  • Feldman, David

Abstract

The signaling model of Spence (1973) and the screening model of Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976) have been separately used to explain economic phenomena when there is asymmetric information. In the real world, however, situations of asymmetric information often simultaneously involve signaling and screening. In this paper, we combine signaling and screening mechanisms and demonstrate a signaling-screening separating equilibrium. We present the analysis within the framework of mortgage markets. Borrowers signal their default risk types to lenders by acquiring different credit records. This partially separates borrowers into subsets. Lenders screen each subset by offering menus of mortgage loan contracts. Borrowers, then, self-select by choosing particular contracts from the menu. We show the conditions under which the signaling-screening equilibrium is Pareto superior to a screening-only equilibrium. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Ben-Shahar, Danny & Feldman, David, 2003. "Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 157-178, March-May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:26:y:2003:i:2-3:p:157-78
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    Cited by:

    1. Nan-Kuang Chen & Charles Leung, 2008. "Asset Price Spillover, Collateral and Crises: with an Application to Property Market Policy," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 351-385, November.
    2. Danny Ben-Shahar, 2006. "Screening Mortgage Default Risk: A Unified Theoretical Framework," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(3), pages 215-240.
    3. Amy Cutts & Robert Order, 2004. "On the Economics of Subprime Lending," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 167-196, November.
    4. AKM Rezaul Hossain, 2005. "A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities," Working papers 2005-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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