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High Bids and Broke Winners

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Luciano I. De Castro & Alvaro Riascos, 2007. "Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 004382, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  2. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
  3. De Frutos, María Ángeles & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2012. "Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-03, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  4. Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Bidding to lose? Auctions with resale," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 1090-1112, December.
  5. Decarolis, Francesco & Giorgiantonio, Cristina, 2015. "Local public procurement regulations: The case of Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 209-226.
  6. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2002. "Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 215-236, May.
  7. Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005. "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 936-959, September.
  8. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2010. "Bidding with Securities: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1929-1935, September.
  9. Bucciol, Alessandro & Chillemi, Ottorino & Palazzi, Giacomo, 2013. "Cost overrun and auction format in small size public works," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 35-42.
  10. Zheng Charles Zhoucheng, 2009. "The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-11, May.
  11. Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  12. Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh Vohra, 2008. "Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(4), pages 245-257, December.
  13. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2010. "Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement: Are There any Fringe Bidders?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 163-187, March.
  14. Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2014. "Sophisticated Bidders In Beauty-Contest Auctions," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0187, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  15. Linus Wilson, 2011. "Troubling Research on Troubled Assets: Charles Zheng on the U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 8(1), pages 33-38, January.
  16. Burguet, Roberto & Ganuza, Juan-José & Hauk, Esther, 2012. "Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 15-25.
  17. Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2005. "Optimal Auctions for Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1419, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
  19. Arve, Malin, 2014. "Procurement and predation: Dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 157-168.
  20. Lamping, Jennifer, 2007. "The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk," MPRA Paper 24375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  22. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June.
  23. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2006. "Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 43-71, April.
  24. Liu, Tingjun, 2016. "Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 94-123.
  25. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 13/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
  27. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  28. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & FLÁVIO MENEZES & MATTHEW RYAN, 2015. "Default and Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Auctions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 49-77, February.
  29. repec:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:262-285 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Campo, Sandra, 2012. "Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: Identification, estimation and application to construction procurements," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 96-107.
  31. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
  32. Matthew Roelofs, 2002. "Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 233-252, December.
  33. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-108.
  34. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2008. "Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 407-440, June.
  35. Pai, Mallesh M. & Vohra, Rakesh, 2014. "Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 383-425.
  36. Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  37. Ottorino Chillemi & Claudio Mezzetti, 2014. "Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 335-355, February.
  38. Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Pezanis-Christou, Paul & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Selten, Reinhard, 2005. "An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 505-530, February.
  39. Yigal Gerchak, 2016. "Procurement (Reverse) Auctions Where Service Providers have Official Ratings," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(04), pages 1-10, December.
  40. Selcuk, Cemil, 2011. "Trading mechanism selection with budget constraints," MPRA Paper 36227, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  41. Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Paper 2011-096, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  42. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2014. "Sequential Auctions, Price Trends, and Risk Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-139/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  43. Matthew Ryan & Flávio Menezes, 2013. "Default and Renegotiation in PPP Auctions," Discussion Papers Series 484, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  44. Nakabayashi, Jun, 2013. "Small business set-asides in procurement auctions: An empirical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 28-44.
  45. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
  46. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.
  47. Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  48. repec:eee:matsoc:v:88:y:2017:i:c:p:11-15 is not listed on IDEAS
  49. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
  50. Quintero Jaramillo, Jose E., 2004. "Liquidity constraints and credit subsidies in auctions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb040604, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  51. A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
  52. repec:kap:jrefec:v:56:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11146-017-9618-z is not listed on IDEAS
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