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Local public procurement regulations: The case of Italy

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  • Decarolis, Francesco
  • Giorgiantonio, Cristina

Abstract

Regional and local authorities award 54% of the public works contracts submitted to the Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts. This paper analyses the regulations adopted in the period 2000–2010 in all Italian regions and a sample of provinces and municipalities and shows how highly pervasive they are. In some cases they had positive effects that served the specific needs of the territory; in others, an anti-competitive orientation prevailed, with extra costs for the contracting authorities and less efficient allocation of resources. The paper's policy recommendations include: (i) greater coordination of reforms between the central and the local levels; (ii) an enhanced role for the sector authorities; (iii) improvements in national regulations so that the regional and local authorities have less of an interest in modifying them; (iv) greater transparency and better information quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Decarolis, Francesco & Giorgiantonio, Cristina, 2015. "Local public procurement regulations: The case of Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 209-226.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:209-226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.08.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zheng, Charles Z., 2001. "High Bids and Broke Winners," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 129-171, September.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743.
    3. Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    4. Marion, Justin, 2007. "Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1591-1624, August.
    5. Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Valentina Giovanniello, 2011. "The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors," Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 235-272.
    6. Francesco Decarolis, 2014. "Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 108-132, January.
    7. Justin Marion, 2009. "How Costly Is Affirmative Action? Government Contracting and California's Proposition 209," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 503-522, August.
    8. Elisabetta Iossa & Federico Antellini Russo, 2008. "Potenzialità e criticità del Partenariato Pubblico Privato in Italia," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 98(3), pages 125-158, May-June.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:hepoli:v:121:y:2017:i:5:p:515-524 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Audinga Baltrunaite & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Sauro Mocetti & Tommaso Orlando, 2018. "Discretion and supplier selection in public procurement," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1178, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Infrastructure; Auctions; Regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General

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