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Local public procurement regulations: The case of Italy

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  • Decarolis, Francesco
  • Giorgiantonio, Cristina

Abstract

Regional and local authorities award 54% of the public works contracts submitted to the Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts. This paper analyses the regulations adopted in the period 2000–2010 in all Italian regions and a sample of provinces and municipalities and shows how highly pervasive they are. In some cases they had positive effects that served the specific needs of the territory; in others, an anti-competitive orientation prevailed, with extra costs for the contracting authorities and less efficient allocation of resources. The paper's policy recommendations include: (i) greater coordination of reforms between the central and the local levels; (ii) an enhanced role for the sector authorities; (iii) improvements in national regulations so that the regional and local authorities have less of an interest in modifying them; (iv) greater transparency and better information quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Decarolis, Francesco & Giorgiantonio, Cristina, 2015. "Local public procurement regulations: The case of Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 209-226.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:209-226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.08.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Marion, Justin, 2007. "Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1591-1624, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Decarolis & Raymond Fisman & Paolo Pinotti & Silvia Vannutelli, 2019. "Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-344, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Condorelli, Daniele & Kim, Jinwoo, 2018. "Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 398-435.
    3. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Calogero Guccio, 2021. "Does greater discretion improve the performance in the execution of public works? Evidence from the reform of discretionary thresholds in Italy," Working papers 108, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    4. Cavalieri, Marina & Cristaudo, Rossana & Guccio, Calogero, 2019. "On the magnitude of cost overruns throughout the project life-cycle: An assessment for the Italian transport infrastructure projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 21-36.
    5. Audinga Baltrunaite & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Sauro Mocetti & Tommaso Orlando, 2021. "Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement [Formal and Real Authority in Organizations]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 134-166.
    6. Feyza G. Sahinyazan & Marie‐Ève Rancourt & Vedat Verter, 2021. "Improving Transportation Procurement in the Humanitarian Sector: A Data‐driven Approach for Abnormally Low Bid Detection," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(4), pages 1082-1109, April.
    7. Giuseppe Vita & Livio Ferrante, 2021. "Is legislation grease or sand to economic growth? An econometric analysis using data from Italian regions before and after the 2008 crisis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 541-561, June.
    8. Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020. "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 544, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Giuseppe F Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2017. "Understanding the procurement performance of local governments: A duration analysis of public works," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 35(5), pages 809-827, August.
    10. Cavalieri, Marina & Guccio, Calogero & Rizzo, Ilde, 2017. "On the role of environmental corruption in healthcare infrastructures: An empirical assessment for Italy using DEA with truncated regression approach," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(5), pages 515-524.
    11. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2021. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Papers 2102.09625, arXiv.org.
    12. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Decentralization and Public Procurement Performance: New Evidence from Italy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 58(2), pages 856-880.
    13. Marina Cavalieri & Rossana Cristaudo & Livio Ferrante & Calogero Guccio, 2019. "Does the Project Design Matter for the Performance of Infrastructure Execution? An Assessment for Italy," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 5(1), pages 39-77, March.
    14. Carla Carlucci & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Tommaso Orlando, 2019. "Public works in Italy: time to completion and its determinants," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 538, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    15. Giuliano Marella & Valentina Antoniucci, 2019. "Time Overrun in Public Works—Evidence from North-East Italy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-17, December.
    16. Ravenda, Diego & Giuranno, Michele G. & Valencia-Silva, Maika M. & Argiles-Bosch, Josep M. & García-Blandón, Josep, 2020. "The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Infrastructure; Auctions; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General

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