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The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors

  • Francesco Decarolis


    (University of Wisconsin - Madison)

  • Cristina Giorgiantonio


    (Bank of Italy)

  • Valentina Giovanniello


    (Tribunale di Roma)

Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the awarding of public works contracts, which do not guarantee the correct functioning of the selection mechanisms. Indications from the economic literature and international comparisons suggest a series of possible improvements: i) the elimination of automatic exclusion mechanisms for anomalous tenders (which would reduce the risk of collusion between bidders); ii) the centralization of assessments of anomalous offers under the responsibility of larger adjudicating authorities, with an increase in the surety guarantees provided by the winner, to reduce the risk of subsequent renegotiations; iii) stronger anti-corruption measures; iv) more standardized planning and, for the more complex auctions, competitive dialogue.

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Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) with number 83.

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Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_83_10
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