IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation"

by Jensen, Henrik

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  2. Grischa Perino, 2008. "How Delegation Improves Commitment," Working Papers 0466, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2008.
  3. John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
  4. Jensen, Henrik, 1999. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2341, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Bar-Ilan, Avner & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2006. "Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1043-1060, May.
  6. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  7. Paul R. Masson & Malik D. Shukayev, 2008. "Are Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard," Staff Working Papers 08-27, Bank of Canada.
  8. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2001. "Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 622, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2012. "Inflation Forecast Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Xavier Debrun, 2011. "Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies," IMF Working Papers 11/173, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Aidt, T. & Magris, F., 2003. "Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0318, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  12. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  13. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA.
  14. Zeno Rotondi & John Driffill, 2003. "Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 292, Society for Computational Economics.
  15. Bilbiie, Florin Ovidiu, 2009. "Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," CEPR Discussion Papers 7482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1998. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers 1995-015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  17. Schellekens, Philip, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0025, European Central Bank.
  18. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
  20. Bendor, Jonathan & Glazer, Ami & Hammond, Thomas H., 2000. "Theories of Delegation in Political Science," Research Papers 1655, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  21. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2009. "Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules," Working Papers 0911, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
  22. Levent Koçkesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424.
  23. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2008. "Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 401-411, November.
  24. Ruge-Murcia, F.J., 1998. "Uncovering Financial Markets Beliefs About Inflation Targets," Cahiers de recherche 9803, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  25. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, 03.
  26. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Working papers 2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
  27. Johansson, Åsa, 2002. "The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems," Seminar Papers 708, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  28. Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 1-15, July.
  29. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn & Yulin Liu, 2015. "Forward Guidance Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5375, CESifo Group Munich.
  30. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  31. Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2000. "Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 400, CESifo Group Munich.
  32. RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2001. "A Prudent Central Banker," Cahiers de recherche 2001-07, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  33. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "The Utopia of Implementing Monetary Policy Cooperation through Domestic Institutions," Economics Papers 2005-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  34. Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  35. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
  36. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  37. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 01/205, International Monetary Fund.
  38. Keffer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2000. "Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2356, The World Bank.
  39. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0003, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  40. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
  41. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  42. Belke, Ansgar H. & Herz, Bernhard & Vogel, Lukas, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 1798, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  43. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  44. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions; Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund.
  45. Basso, Henrique S, 2008. "Delegation, Time Inconsistency and Sustainable Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 2008:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  46. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  47. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
  48. SCHELLEKENS, Philip, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  49. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.