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Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers (Old Series) 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. Remo Fernández-Carro & Víctor Lapuente-Giné, 2016. "The Emperor’s clothes and the Pied Piper: Bureaucracy and scientific productivity," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 546-561.
  3. Amy Pond, 2021. "Biased politicians and independent agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 279-299, July.
  4. Ms. Francesca Castellani & Mr. Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2001/205, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Mr. Xavier Debrun, 2011. "Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies," IMF Working Papers 2011/173, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2000. "Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 400, CESifo.
  8. Sanghoon Lee, 2010. "Dynamic Inconsistency in Counterterrorism," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(4), pages 369-385, September.
  9. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 3, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  10. Rapson, Jane & Levine, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  11. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
  12. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
  13. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
  14. Paul R. Masson & Malik D. Shukayev, 2019. "Are Bygones Not Bygones? Modeling Price-Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Macroeconomic Modelling and Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes, chapter 11, pages 385-417, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  15. Pichler, Paul & Sorger, Gerhard, 2018. "Delegating climate policy to a supranational authority: a theoretical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 418-440.
  16. Yuan, Huiping & Miller, Stephen M., 2010. "Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 737-745, May.
  17. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  18. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
  19. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Inflation forecast contracts," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 26-40.
  20. Bilbiie, Florin O., 2014. "Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 63-78.
  21. Bar-Ilan, Avner & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2006. "Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1043-1060, May.
  22. Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 1-15, July.
  23. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2008. "Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 401-411, November.
  24. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  25. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
  26. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker & Liu, Yulin, 2019. "Forward Guidance Contracts," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(8), pages 3386-3423, December.
  27. Levent Koçkesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424.
  28. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
  29. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
  30. Belke, Ansgar H. & Herz, Bernhard & Vogel, Lukas, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 1798, IZA Network @ LISER.
  31. Francisco J. Ruge-Murciá, 2002. "A Prudent Central Banker," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 1-7.
  32. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  33. Florin O. Bilbiie, 2011. "The Time Inconsistency of Delegation-Based Time Inconsistency Solutions in Monetary Policy," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 657-674, September.
  34. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2001. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
  35. Perino, Grischa, 2010. "How delegation improves commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 137-139, February.
  36. Mridula Duggal & Luis E. Rojas, 2023. "Optimal Disinflation with Delegation and Limited Credibility," Working Papers 1401, Barcelona School of Economics.
  37. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 317-342, December.
  38. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  39. John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
  40. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  41. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "The Utopia of Implementing Monetary Policy Cooperation through Domestic Institutions," Economics Papers 2005-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  42. SCHELLEKENS, Philip, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  43. Bendor, J. & Glazer, A. & Hammond, T.H., 2000. "Theories of Delegation in Political Science," Papers 00-01-14, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  44. Burkovskaya, Anastasia, 2019. "Political economy behind central bank independence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-1.
  45. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
  46. repec:hal:journl:hal-01682693 is not listed on IDEAS
  47. repec:awi:wpaper:0466 is not listed on IDEAS
  48. Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2000. "Uncovering financial markets' beliefs about inflation targets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 483-512.
  49. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
  50. Elena Seghezza, 2020. "Governor Baffi’s View on the Italian Great Inflation," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 563-584, November.
  51. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
  52. Basso, Henrique S., 2009. "Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1617-1629, August.
  53. Driffill, John & Rotondi, Zeno, 2003. "Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3923, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  54. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
  55. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  56. Schellekens, Philip, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 25, European Central Bank.
  57. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0003, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  58. Dennis W. Jansen & Liqun Liu & Ming‐Jang Weng, 2007. "Sustainability Of The Friedman Rule In An International Monetary Policy Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 470-486, July.
  59. Johansson, Åsa, 2002. "The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems," Seminar Papers 708, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  60. Alnafrah, Ibrahim & Bogatov, Alexander, 2025. "Comparative fiscal governance policy: Evaluating the causal impact of fiscal councils on economic performance," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 49(3).
  61. Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June.
  62. Mr. Xavier Debrun & Mr. Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 2007/171, International Monetary Fund.
  63. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  64. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  65. Xavier Debrun & Paul R. Masson & Catherine Pattillo, 2019. "Should African Monetary Unions Be Expanded? An Empirical Investigation of the Scope for Monetary Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Macroeconomic Modelling and Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes, chapter 6, pages 195-242, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  66. Keffer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2000. "Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2356, The World Bank.
  67. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
  68. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
  69. Donato Masciandaro, 2026. "Monetary Policy and Taylor Reaction Functions: Business Cycles, Central Bank Governance and Central Bankers’ Preferences," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 26270, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
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