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Citations for "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation"

by Jensen, Henrik

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  1. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "The Utopia of Implementing Monetary Policy Cooperation through Domestic Institutions," Economics Papers 2005-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  2. SCHELLEKENS, Philip, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  3. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Paper 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  4. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Inflation forecast contracts," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 26-40.
  5. Bendor, J. & Glazer, A. & Hammond, T.H., 2000. "Theories of Delegation in Political Science," Papers 00-01-14, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  6. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
  7. Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June.
  8. Levent Koçkesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424.
  9. Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2000. "Uncovering financial markets' beliefs about inflation targets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 483-512.
  10. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
  11. Perino, Grischa, 2010. "How delegation improves commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 137-139, February.
  12. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
  13. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 01/205, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
  15. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2008. "Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 401-411, November.
  16. Basso, Henrique S., 2009. "Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1617-1629, August.
  17. Driffill, John & Rotondi, Zeno, 2003. "Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA.
  19. Schellekens, Philip, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0025, European Central Bank.
  20. Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2000. "Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 400, CESifo Group Munich.
  21. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 3, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  22. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
  24. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, 03.
  25. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Masson, Paul R. & Shukayev, Malik D., 2011. "Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 162-175, June.
  27. Yuan, Huiping & Miller, Stephen M., 2010. "Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 737-745, May.
  28. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  29. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions; Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund.
  30. Bilbiie, Florin O., 2014. "Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 63-78.
  31. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0003, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  32. Bar-Ilan, Avner & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2006. "Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1043-1060, May.
  33. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 263/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  34. Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 1-15, July.
  35. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  36. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
  37. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn & Yulin Liu, 2015. "Forward Guidance Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5375, CESifo Group Munich.
  38. Francisco J. Ruge-Murciá, 2002. "A Prudent Central Banker," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 1-7.
  39. Johansson, Åsa, 2002. "The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems," Seminar Papers 708, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  40. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  41. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
  42. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  43. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  44. Xavier Debrun, 2011. "Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies," IMF Working Papers 11/173, International Monetary Fund.
  45. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  46. Lossani Marco & Natale Piergiovanna & Tirelli Patrizio, 2001. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
  47. John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
  48. Keffer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2000. "Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2356, The World Bank.
  49. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
  50. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
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