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Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment

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  • John Driffill
  • Zeno Rotondi

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Suggested Citation

  • John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1361-1366 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1361
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 207-211.
    2. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    3. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 98-114.
    4. Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 911-920.
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    Cited by:

    1. Basso, Henrique S, 2008. "Delegation, Time Inconsistency and Sustainable Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 2008:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Masson, Paul R. & Shukayev, Malik D., 2011. "Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, pages 162-175.
    3. Basso, Henrique S., 2009. "Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1617-1629, August.

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