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Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment

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  • John Driffill
  • Zeno Rotondi

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  • John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1361-1366
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1361
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
    2. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    3. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    4. Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-920, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul R. Masson & Malik D. Shukayev, 2019. "Are Bygones Not Bygones? Modeling Price-Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Macroeconomic Modelling and Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes, chapter 11, pages 385-417, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Pichler, Paul & Sorger, Gerhard, 2018. "Delegating climate policy to a supranational authority: a theoretical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 418-440.
    3. Basso, Henrique S., 2009. "Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1617-1629, August.

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