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Banking Union as a Shock Absorber

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  • Belke, Ansgar
  • Gros, Daniel

Abstract

This study investigates the shock-absorbing properties of a banking union by providing a detailed comparison between the way regional financial shocks have been absorbed at the federal level in the US, but have led to severe regional (national) financial dislocation and tensions in the euro area. The extent to which the institutions of the banking union, which is now emerging in the euro area, should increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles is also discussed. Cross-border capital flows in the form of equity appear to be much more stable than those taking the form of credit, especially inter-bank credit. Moreover, credit booms and bust leave a debt overhang and losses can materialise only via insolvencies, whereas equity flows absorb automatically losses in case of a bust and provide the cross border owner with incentives to continue to provide financing. It follows that cross-border banks can absorb regional shocks. But large banks pose the 'too big to fail' problem and they would also propagate regional shocks, especially if they originate in large countries, to the entire area.

Suggested Citation

  • Belke, Ansgar & Gros, Daniel, 2015. "Banking Union as a Shock Absorber," Ruhr Economic Papers 548, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:548
    DOI: 10.4419/86788626
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    Cited by:

    1. Thirion, Gilles, 2017. "European Fiscal Union: Economic rationale and design challenges," CEPS Papers 12160, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    2. Francesco Spadafora, 2020. "Completing the Economic and Monetary Union: Wisdom Come Late?," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 379-409, November.
    3. Dirk Schoenmaker, 2018. "Resolution of international banks: Can smaller countries cope?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 39-54, March.
    4. Francesco Spadafora, 2019. "European integration in the time of mistrust," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 512, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Belke, Ansgar & Dobrzańska, Anna & Gros, Daniel & Smaga, Paweł, 2016. "(When) should a non-euro country join the banking union?," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PA), pages 4-19.
    6. Cimadomo, Jacopo & Giuliodori, Massimo & Lengyel, Andras & Mumtaz, Haroon, 2023. "Changing patterns of risk-sharing channels in the United States and the euro area," Working Paper Series 2849, European Central Bank.
    7. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2016. "Sovereign-bank linkages: Quantifying directional intensity of risk transfers in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 137-164.
    8. Alcidi, Cinzia & Thirion, Gilles, 2016. "Assessing the Euro Area�s Shock-Absorption Capacity - Risk sharing, consumption smoothing and fiscal policyAbstract: Based on a combination of quantitative analysis and a qualitative forward-looking," CEPS Papers 11875, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    9. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2015. "Bank risk behavior and connectedness in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-184.
    10. Magdalena Kąkol, 2017. "Designing a fiscal union for the euro area," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 16(4), pages 413-432, December.
    11. Marta Gómez-Puig & Simón Sosvilla-Rivero & Manish K. Singh, 2018. "“Incorporating creditors' seniority into contingent claim models:Application to peripheral euro area countries”," IREA Working Papers 201803, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Feb 2018.
    12. Cimadomo, Jacopo & Gordo Mora, Esther & Palazzo, Alessandra Anna, 2022. "Enhancing private and public risk sharing: lessons from the literature and reflections on the COVID-19 crisis," Occasional Paper Series 306, European Central Bank.
    13. Gros Daniel, 2018. "An Evolutionary Path Towards a European Monetary Fund," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking union; currency union; default; shock absorber; two-tier reinsurance system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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