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Banking Union as a Shock Absorber

Author

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  • Ansgar Belke
  • Daniel Gros

Abstract

This study investigates the shock-absorbing properties of a banking union by providing a detailed comparison between the way regional financial shocks have been absorbed at the federal level in the US, but have led to severe regional (national) financial dislocation and tensions in Europe and particularly in the euro area. The institutions of the banking union, which is now emerging in the euro area, should increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles. Cross-border capital flows in the form of equity appear to be much more stable than those taking the form of credit, especially inter-bank credit. It therefore follows that cross-border banks would be useful to deal with regional shocks. But large banks pose the ‘too big to fail’ problem and they would also propagate regional shocks, especially if they originate in large countries, to the entire area. The extent to which the (incomplete) banking union now put in place for the euro area provides some shock absorption is also discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Belke & Daniel Gros, 2015. "Banking Union as a Shock Absorber," ROME Working Papers 201502, ROME Network.
  • Handle: RePEc:rmn:wpaper:201502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2016. "Sovereign-bank linkages: Quantifying directional intensity of risk transfers in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 137-164.
    2. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2015. "Bank risk behavior and connectedness in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-184.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking union; currency union; default; shock absorber; two-tier reinsurance system.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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