Trade liberalization in vertically related markets

This paper looks into the desirability of trade liberalization for manufacturers, retailers and consumers. The analysis compares the move from the autarky situation to either one of free trade that entails a change in the distribution system or not. We also examine whether the interests of manufacturers and retailers about the preferred distribution system coincide, provided trade opens. We find that market integration is beneficial to all agents only under certain conditions on the degree of market asymmetry and the degree of product differentiation. Interestingly, if integration entails a change in the distribution system, the conflict between manufacturers and retailers strengthens since only retailers prefer free trade when markets are not too asymmetric and when interbrand competition is sufficiently strong. Furthermore, consumers can be harmed by trade and, in a setting without exclusivities, one country may experience a welfare decrease. Finally, the analysis of the strategic choice concerning exclusivity clauses uncovers that retailers and manufacturers never agree about their preference for endogenous distribution systems.