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Employee types and endofenous organizational design: An experiment

  • Antoni Cunyat

    ()

    (Universitat de València)

  • Randolph Sloof

    (CERGE-EI)

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to test whether organizations make full effective use of the available preference types within their work force when drafting their organizational design. Our main finding is that they do not do so; although the importance of social preferences is recognized by those choosing the organizational mode, the significant impact managers' preferences have on the behavior of workers in the organization seems to be overlooked. Keywords:employee, organizational design, social preferences. Cuando los managers poseen unas preferencias sociales lo suficientemente importantes, los incentivos generados en organizaciones basadas en contratos informales implícitos pueden ser una alternativa menos costosa que la basada en contratos formales explícitos y supervisión. En este trabajo presentamos los resultados de un experimento en el laboratorio diseñado para examinar si las organizaciones hacen un uso completamente efectivo de los diferentes tipos de preferencias presentes en su fuerza de trabajo a la hora de diseñar una organización Nuestro principal resultado es que éste uso no es completo; aunque los responsables de diseñar los modos organizativos reconocen la importancia de las preferencias sociales, el impacto significativo que las preferencias de los managers tienen sobre el comportamiento de los trabajadores es aparentemente es ignorado

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2009-04.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2009
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2009-04.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2009-04
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