IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Cost uncertainty and trade liberalization in international oligopoly

  • Moner-Colonques, Rafael

In a game of incomplete information about costs we investigate conditions under which autarkic firms benefit from the opening of trade, both when the number of firms is exogenously and endogenously fixed. A social point of view is also taken to check under which circumstances bilateral trade liberalization is to both countries' advantage. We show that there may be cases when free trade is privately and socially favourable compared to the autarky situation. Typically everybody's interests harmonize for a certain degree of firms' diversification and a sufficiently large amount of uncertainty.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V6D-3TC0V8Y-9/2/09ccb09d1eca12c2cd05eb068ee316c9
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 369-376

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:45:y:1998:i:2:p:369-376
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  3. Moner-Colonques, Rafael, 1998. "Cost uncertainty and trade liberalization in international oligopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 369-376, August.
  4. S. Lael Brainard & David Martimort, 1992. "Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers," NBER Working Papers 4069, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Anderson, Simon P & Donsimoni, M-P & Gabszewicz, J J, 1989. "Is International Trade Profitable to Oligopolistic Industries?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 725-33, November.
  6. Cabrales, Antonio & Motta, Massimo, 1996. "Country Asymmetries, Endogenous Product Choice and the Speed of Trade Liberalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 1326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Tito CORDELLA, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and Oligopolistic Industries : A Welfare Appraisal," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1993033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  8. Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 433-46, July.
  9. Markusen, James R. & Venables, Anthony J, 1986. "Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions," CEPR Discussion Papers 120, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:45:y:1998:i:2:p:369-376. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.