IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Banken treiben Eurokrise

  • Fabian Lindner

Der Report betrachtet das Verhalten der Gläubiger - vor allem der Banken - in der Eurokrise. Die größten Gläubiger der heutigen Krisenländer Griechenland, Spanien, Irland, Portugal und Italien sind deutsche und französische Banken. Diese haben 2008 große Verluste in der US-Subprimekrise erlitten und mussten ihre Bilanz verkürzen, was zu einem Abbau ihrer Auslandsforderungen geführt hat. Der Forderungsabbau hat zu einem plötzlichen Anhalten der Kreditvergabe geführt, der die Krise im Euroraum mit ausgelöst hat. Dass die Banken sich so verhalten haben, liegt an der Bankenregulierung und den Regeln des Euroraums. Nach der Bankenregulierung Basel II müssen Banken prozyklisch ihr Kapital erhöhen, wenn ihre Forderungen risikoreicher werden. In einer Finanzkrise erfolgt diese Kapitalanpassung meist über den Abbau von Forderungen. Die Regeln des Euroraums erlauben eine staatliche Insolvenz, so dass Gläubiger Verluste tragen müssen. Steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Insolvenz, müssen Gläubiger ihre Forderungen so schnell wie möglich verringern, um selbst ihr Kapital und damit ihre eigene Solvenz zu erhalten. Notwendige Bedingung der Stabilisierung des Euroraums wäre damit eine Garantie, Staaten nicht insolvent gehen zu lassen. Darüber hinaus sollte die Bankenregulierung weniger prozyklisch ausgestaltet werden.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute in its series IMK Report with number 82-2013.

in new window

Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imk:report:82-2013
Contact details of provider: Postal: Hans-Böckler-Straße 39, 40476 Düsseldorf
Phone: +49 211 7778 234
Fax: +49 211 7778 4234
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Merler, S. & Pisani-Ferry, J., 2012. "Hazardous tango: sovereign-bank interdependence and financial stability in the euro area," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 201-210, April.
  2. Ines Drumond, 2009. "Bank Capital Requirements, Business Cycle Fluctuations And The Basel Accords: A Synthesis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 798-830, December.
  3. Claudio Borio & Piti Disyatat, 2011. "Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link?," BIS Working Papers 346, Bank for International Settlements.
  4. Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Cedric Tille, 2011. "The Great Retrenchment: International Capital Flows During the Global Financial Crisis," Working Papers 382011, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  5. International Monetary Fund, 2010. "European Financial Linkages: A New Look At Imbalances," IMF Working Papers 10/295, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Philip R. Lane & Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2000. "External Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 00/152, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Kopf, Christian, 2011. "Restoring financial stability in the euro area," CEPS Papers 4292, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  8. Fabian Valencia & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update," IMF Working Papers 12/163, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "Spillovers through banking centers: a panel data analysis of bank flows," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 483-509, August.
  10. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Benedicta Marzinotto, 2010. "Two crises, two responses," Policy Briefs 392, Bruegel.
  11. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Reinhart, Vincent, 2008. "Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of the Past and Present," CEPR Discussion Papers 6996, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Hutchison, Michael M. & Noy, Ilan & Wang, Lidan, 2010. "Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 973-987, October.
  13. Ruo Chen & Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "External Imbalances in the Euro Area," IMF Working Papers 12/236, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Hyun Song Shin, 2012. "Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 60(2), pages 155-192, July.
  15. Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, 2012. "Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Papers 12/284, International Monetary Fund.
  16. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 15-36.
  17. Gustav A. Horn & Fabian Lindner & Torsten Niechoj, 2011. "Schuldenschnitt für Griechenland - ein gefährlicher Irrweg für den Euroraum," IMK Report 63-2011, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
  18. Erik Klär & Fabian Lindner & Kenan Šehović, 2013. "Investition in die Zukunft? Zur Entwicklung des deutschen Auslandsvermögens," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 189-197, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imk:report:82-2013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabine Nemitz)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.