IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-00243034.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Food Safety, Liability and Collective Norms

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Giraud-Héraud

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Hakim Hammoudi

    (UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Louis-Georges Soler

    (INRA)

Abstract

Over the last few years, retailers have implemented new collective private norms in order to improve food safety and reduce the risks related to microbial contamination and pesticide residues. In this paper, we propose a model of vertical relationships in which a group of retailers imposes more stringent specifications to upstream producers. We consider that the contamination risk is endogenously determined by the efforts made by the producers in order to improve food safety. We also consider that the penalty costs – related to the liability rule in the event of a crisis – decrease accordingly as the requirement level of the collective norm rises. We show how the liability rule influences the level of the collective norm and the contamination risk

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Giraud-Héraud & Hakim Hammoudi & Louis-Georges Soler, 2006. "Food Safety, Liability and Collective Norms," Working Papers hal-00243034, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243034
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00243034
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00243034/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erik Lichtenberg & Tony M. Penn, 2003. "Prevention versus Treatment under Precautionary Regulation: A Case Study of Groundwater Contamination under Uncertainty," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 44-58.
    2. Zijun Wang & Victoria Salin & Neal Hooker & David Leatham, 2002. "Stock market reaction to food recalls: a GARCH application," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(15), pages 979-987.
    3. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
    4. John A. Fox & David A. Hennessy, 1999. "Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 359-372.
    5. Codron, Jean-Marie & Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Soler, Louis-Georges, 2005. "Minimum quality standards, premium private labels, and European meat and fresh produce retailing," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 270-283, June.
    6. David A. Hennessy & Jutta Roosen & John A. Miranowski, 2001. "Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 862-874.
    7. Anonymous & Gehlhar, Mark J., 2005. "New Directions In Global Food Markets," Agricultural Information Bulletins 33751, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    8. James BARRETT & Kathleen SEGERSON, "undated". "Prevention And Treatment In Food Safety: An Analysis Of Conceptual Issues," Department of Resource Economics Regional Research Project 9521, University of Massachusetts.
    9. Barrett, James & Segerson, Kathleen, 1997. "Prevention and Treatment in Environmental Policy Design," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 196-213, June.
    10. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
    11. Elamin H. Elbasha* & T. Lynn Riggs, 2003. "The effects of information on producer and consumer incentives to undertake food safety efforts: A theoretical model and policy implications," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 29-42.
    12. Thomas L. Sporleder & Peter D. Goldsmith, 2001. "Alternative Firm Strategies for Signaling Quality in the Food System," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 49(4), pages 591-604, December.
    13. John M. Crespi & St)phan Marette, 2001. "How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-861.
    14. Michael R. Thomsen & Andrew M. McKenzie, 2001. "Market Incentives for Safe Foods: An Examination of Shareholder Losses from Meat and Poultry Recalls," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 526-538.
    15. Loureiro, Maria L. & McCluskey, Jill J. & Mittelhammer, Ronald C., 2001. "Assessing Consumer Preferences For Organic, Eco-Labeled, And Regular Apples," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 26(02), December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Crifo & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2008. "RSE et/ou performance financière : points de repère et pistes de recherche," Working Papers hal-00347644, HAL.
    2. Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Grazia, Cristina & Hammoudi, Abdelhakim, 2007. "Agrifood safety standards, market power and consumer misperceptions," 105th Seminar, March 8-10, 2007, Bologna, Italy 7849, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243034. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.