Food Safety, Liability and Collective Norms
Over the last few years, retailers have implemented new collective private norms in order to improve food safety and reduce the risks related to microbial contamination and pesticide residues. In this paper, we propose a model of vertical relationships in which a group of retailers imposes more stringent specifications to upstream producers. We consider that the contamination risk is endogenously determined by the efforts made by the producers in order to improve food safety. We also consider that the penalty costs – related to the liability rule in the event of a crisis – decrease accordingly as the requirement level of the collective norm rises. We show how the liability rule influences the level of the collective norm and the contamination risk
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00243034|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barrett, James & Segerson, Kathleen, 1997. "Prevention and Treatment in Environmental Policy Design," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 196-213, June.
- James BARRETT & Kathleen SEGERSON, "undated".
"Prevention And Treatment In Food Safety: An Analysis Of Conceptual Issues,"
Department of Resource Economics Regional Research Project
9521, University of Massachusetts.
- Barrett, James P. & Segerson, Kathleen, 1995. "Prevention And Treatment In Food Safety: An Analysis Of Conceptual Issues," Proceedings: The Economics of Reducing Health Risk from Food, June 6-7, 1995, Washington, D.C. 25956, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
- Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
- John A. Fox & David A. Hennessy, 1999. "Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 359-372.
- Fox, John A. & Hennessy, David A., 1999. "Cost-Effective Hazard Control in Food Handling," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1711, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Codron, Jean-Marie & Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Soler, Louis-Georges, 2005. "Minimum quality standards, premium private labels, and European meat and fresh produce retailing," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 270-283, June.
- John M. Crespi & St)phan Marette, 2001. "How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-861.
- Elamin H. Elbasha* & T. Lynn Riggs, 2003. "The effects of information on producer and consumer incentives to undertake food safety efforts: A theoretical model and policy implications," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 29-42.
- David A. Hennessy & Jutta Roosen & John A. Miranowski, 2001. "Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 862-874.
- Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta & Miranowski, John, 2001. "Leadership and the Provision of Safe Food," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10549, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Anonymous & Gehlhar, Mark J., 2005. "New Directions In Global Food Markets," Agricultural Information Bulletins 33751, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Michael R. Thomsen & Andrew M. McKenzie, 2001. "Market Incentives for Safe Foods: An Examination of Shareholder Losses from Meat and Poultry Recalls," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 526-538.
- Erik Lichtenberg & Tony M. Penn, 2003. "Prevention versus Treatment under Precautionary Regulation: A Case Study of Groundwater Contamination under Uncertainty," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 44-58.
- Lichtenberg, Erik & Penn, Tony M., 2001. "Prevention Versus Treatment Under Precautionary Regulation: A Case Study Of Groundwater Contamination Under Uncertainty," Working Papers 28584, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Loureiro, Maria L. & McCluskey, Jill J. & Mittelhammer, Ronald C., 2001. "Assessing Consumer Preferences For Organic, Eco-Labeled, And Regular Apples," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 26(02), December.
- Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
- Thomas L. Sporleder & Peter D. Goldsmith, 2001. "Alternative Firm Strategies for Signaling Quality in the Food System," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 49(4), pages 591-604, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243034. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.