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Monitoring and sanctioning cheating at school: What works? Evidence from a national evaluation program

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Listed:
  • Claudio Lucifora

    () (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
    Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

  • Marco Tonello

Abstract

The diffusion of evaluation programs, along with the higher stake they account for, has also increased the prevalence of opportunistic behavior and cheating practices. This paper investigates the efficacy of different policy measures aimed at fighting cheating behaviors in schools. We exploit a classroom-based randomized experiment in Italian public schools, which assigned an external inspector to monitor the administration and marking of the tests, as well as different sanctioning mechanisms for schools suspect of cheating. We find that higher monitoring is effective in deterring cheating at all grades, while sanctions in general have no effect, and, under specific circumstances, may also trigger schools’ strategic behaviors, such as selective pooling. The ineffectiveness of sanctioning schemes is explained by the fact that they are not embedded in a proper school accountability system.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Lucifora & Marco Tonello, 2016. "Monitoring and sanctioning cheating at school: What works? Evidence from a national evaluation program," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def051, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def051
    as

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    File URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def051.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Tettamanzi, 2017. "E Many Pluribus Unum: A Behavioural Macro-Economic Agent Based Model," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def062, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    2. Elena Cottini & Paolo Ghinetti, 2017. "Is it the way you live or the job you have? Health effects of lifestyles and working conditions," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def056, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cheating; monitoring; incentives.;

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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