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Monitoring and sanctioning cheating at school: What works? Evidence from a national evaluation program

Listed author(s):
  • Claudio Lucifora

    ()

    (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
    Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

  • Marco Tonello

The diffusion of evaluation programs, along with the higher stake they account for, has also increased the prevalence of opportunistic behavior and cheating practices. This paper investigates the efficacy of different policy measures aimed at fighting cheating behaviors in schools. We exploit a classroom-based randomized experiment in Italian public schools, which assigned an external inspector to monitor the administration and marking of the tests, as well as different sanctioning mechanisms for schools suspect of cheating. We find that higher monitoring is effective in deterring cheating at all grades, while sanctions in general have no effect, and, under specific circumstances, may also trigger schools’ strategic behaviors, such as selective pooling. The ineffectiveness of sanctioning schemes is explained by the fact that they are not embedded in a proper school accountability system.

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File URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def051.pdf
File Function: First version, 2016
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Paper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) in its series DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza with number def051.

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Length: 37
Date of creation: Oct 2016
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def051
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/defin
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  1. Thomas S. Dee & Will Dobbie & Brian A. Jacob & Jonah Rockoff, 2016. "The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations," NBER Working Papers 22165, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. David Card & Laura Giuliano, 2013. "Peer Effects and Multiple Equilibria in the Risky Behavior of Friends," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1130-1149, October.
  3. Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2013. "When the cat is near, the mice won't play: The effect of external examiners in Italian schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 65-77.
  4. Rebecca Diamond & Petra Persson, 2016. "The Long-term Consequences of Teacher Discretion in Grading of High-stakes Tests," NBER Working Papers 22207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Giorgio Brunello & Daniele Checchi, 2007. "Does school tracking affect equality of opportunity? New international evidence," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 22, pages 781-861, October.
  6. Erich Battistin & Michele De Nadai & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "Counting Rotten Apples: Student Achievement and Score Manipulation in Italian Elementary Schools," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2014-05, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
  7. Estrada, Ricardo, 2015. "Rules Rather than Discretion: Teacher Hiring and Rent Extraction," Economics Working Papers MWP2015/14, European University Institute.
  8. Jere R. Behrman & Susan W. Parker & Petra E. Todd & Kenneth I. Wolpin, 2015. "Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(2), pages 325-364.
  9. Thomas S. Dee & Brian A. Jacob, 2012. "Rational Ignorance in Education: A Field Experiment in Student Plagiarism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(2), pages 397-434.
  10. Sarah R. Cohodes, 2016. "Teaching to the Student: Charter School Effectiveness in Spite of Perverse Incentives," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-42, Winter.
  11. Thomas Ahn & Jacob Vigdor, 2014. "The Impact of No Child Left Behind's Accountability Sanctions on School Performance: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from North Carolina," NBER Working Papers 20511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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