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Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading?

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Listed:
  • Patrick A. Puhani

    (Leibniz Universität Hannover)

  • Philip Yang

    (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)

Abstract

Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we assess the effect of introducing centralized scoring standards into schools with higher and lower quality peer groups. We find that implementation of these standards increases scoring differences between the two school types by about 25 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick A. Puhani & Philip Yang, 2019. "Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading?," RF Berlin - CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1911, Rockwool Foundation Berlin (RF Berlin) - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM).
    • Handle: RePEc:crm:wpaper:1911
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subjective performance evaluation; rating standards; policy reform; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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