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Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading?

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  • Puhani, Patrick A.
  • Yang, Philip

Abstract

Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we assess the effect of introducing centralized scoring standards into schools with higher and lower quality peer groups. We find that implementation of these standards increases scoring differences between the two school types by about 25 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Puhani, Patrick A. & Yang, Philip, 2019. "Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 412, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:412
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    Cited by:

    1. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
    2. Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subjective performance evaluation; rating standards; policy reform; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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