Central exit examinations increase performance... but take the fun out of mathematics
In response to PISA, all German federal states but one have adopted central exit examinations (CEEs) at the end of all secondary school tracks. Theoretically, the advantages of CEEs are fairly undisputed. CEEs make teaching and learning output observable and comparable across schools, and provide incentives for teachers and students to increase their effort. In line with earlier research, we confirm that CEEs have a positive causal effect on student performance. We also investigate what actually drives this effect. We find that the teachers' main reaction to CEEs is to increase the amount of homework, and to check and discuss homework more often. Students report increased learning pressure, which has sizeable negative effects on student attitudes towards learning. Students who take central exit exams in mathematics like mathematics less, think it is less easy and they are more likely to find it boring.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://elpub.bib.uni-wuppertal.de|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Felix Büchel, 2003.
"The Effect of Central Exit Examinations on Student Achievement: Quasi-experimental Evidence from TIMSS Germany,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
939, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Felix Büchel, 2005. "The Effect Of Central Exit Examinations On Student Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From TIMSS Germany," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1134-1155, 09.
- Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2007.
"What Can Go Wrong Will Go Wrong: Birthday Effects and Early Tracking in the German School System,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2055, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hendrik JÃ¼rges & Kerstin Schneider, 2007. "What can go wrong will go wrong: Birthday effects and early tracking in the German school system," MEA discussion paper series 07138, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
- Hendrik Jürges & Wolfram F. Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2005.
"Teacher Quality and Incentives: Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Standards on Teacher Quality,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(3), pages 298-, November.
- Hendrik JÃ¼rges & Wolfram F. Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2005. "Teacher quality and incentives - Theoretical and empirical effects of standards on teacher quality," MEA discussion paper series 05091, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
- Hendrik Jürges & Wolfram F. Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2004. "Teacher Quality and Incentives: Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Standards on Teacher Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series 1296, CESifo Group Munich.
- Matthias Effinger & Mattias Polborn, 1999.
"A model of vertically differentiated education,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 53-69, February.
- Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2004. "International Differences in Student Achievement: An Economic Perspective," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(3), pages 357-380, 08.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bwu:schdps:sdp08001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frank Hoffmann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.