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Assessment Drives Learning: The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular Knowledge and Mathematical Literacy

Author

Listed:
  • Hendrik Jürges
  • Kerstin Schneider
  • Martin Senkbeil
  • Claus H. Carstensen

Abstract

In this paper, we use data from the German PISA 2003 sample to study the effects of central exit examinations on student performance, student attitudes, and teacher behavior. Unlike earlier studies we use (i) a value-added measure to pin down the effect of central exit exams on learning in the last year before the exam and (ii) separate test scores for mathematical literacy and curriculum-based knowledge. The findings indicate that central exit exams only improve curriculum-based knowledge but do not affect mathematical literacy. Moreover, teachers in German states with central exit examinations are more active and tend to be more performance oriented. Students, although showing a better performance, are less motivated in school.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Martin Senkbeil & Claus H. Carstensen, 2009. "Assessment Drives Learning: The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular Knowledge and Mathematical Literacy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2666, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2666
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2010. "Central exit examinations increase performance... but take the fun out of mathematics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 497-517, March.
    2. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Felix Büchel, 2005. "The Effect Of Central Exit Examinations On Student Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From TIMSS Germany," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1134-1155, September.
    3. Hendrik Jürges & Wolfram F. Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2005. "Teacher Quality and Incentives: Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Standards on Teacher Quality," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(3), pages 298-326, November.
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    8. Matthias Effinger & Mattias Polborn, 1999. "A model of vertically differentiated education," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 53-69, February.
    9. Alexander, Nicola A., 2000. "The missing link: an econometric analysis on the impact of curriculum standards on student achievement," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 351-361, October.
    10. Jacob, Brian A., 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 761-796, June.
    11. Hanushek, Eric A., 2011. "The economic value of higher teacher quality," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 466-479, June.
    12. Bishop, J., 1997. "The Effect of national Standards and Curriculum-Based Exams on Achievement," Papers 97-01, Cornell - Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heller-Sahlgren, Gabriel, 2018. "Smart but unhappy: Independent-school competition and the wellbeing-efficiency trade-off in education," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 66-81.
    2. Schwerdt, Guido & Woessmann, Ludger, 2017. "The information value of central school exams," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 65-79.
    3. Ludger Woessmann, 2016. "The Importance of School Systems: Evidence from International Differences in Student Achievement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 3-32, Summer.
    4. Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2022. "Central exams and adult skills: Evidence from PIAAC," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    5. Ludger Woessmann, 2018. "Central exit exams improve student outcomes," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 419-419, January.
    6. Miroslava Federicova, 2014. "The Impact of High-Stakes School-Admission Exams on Study Effort and Achievements: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Slovakia," Investigaciones de Economía de la Educación volume 9, in: Adela García Aracil & Isabel Neira Gómez (ed.), Investigaciones de Economía de la Educación 9, edition 1, volume 9, chapter 27, pages 515-532, Asociación de Economía de la Educación.
    7. Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009. "A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 20906, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
    8. Elke Lüdemann, 2011. "Schooling and the Formation of Cognitive and Non-cognitive Outcomes," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 39.
    9. Piopiunik, Marc & Schwerdt, Guido & Woessmann, Ludger, 2013. "Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 93-108.
    10. Miroslava Federičová & Daniel Münich, 2017. "The impact of high-stakes school admission exams on study achievements: quasi-experimental evidence from Slovakia," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(4), pages 1069-1092, October.
    11. Koerselman, Kristian, 2013. "Incentives from curriculum tracking," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 140-150.
    12. Carl Sherwood & Do Won Kwak, 2017. "New insights into an old problem – enhancing student learning outcomes in an introductory statistics course," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(56), pages 5698-5708, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central exit exams; value added; achievement; teacher quality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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